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I. INTRODUCTIONON September 26, 2014, college students gathered in the town of
Iguala, Mexico, located in the state of Guerrero, to protest
teacher-hiring practices that they viewed as discriminatory. 2
When Jos6 Luis Abarca (Abarca), the mayor of Iguala, learned that these
protests might interfere with a speech being given by his wife, Marfa de
los Angeles Pineda Villa (Pineda Villa), he told Iguala police to "teach
the[ ] [students] a lesson."'3 Iguala police responded to these orders by
attacking the students with gunfire, killing six people,4 including three of
the students, 5 and injuring twenty-five others.6 Forty-three students went
missing for several weeks7 after being taken into police custody.8 Tragi-
cally, these missing students appear to have been killed by drug gangs at a
garbage dump, their bodies then set ablaze.9 Forensic testing confirmed
that a bone fragment found at the dump belonged to one of the missing
2. See Mexican students missing after protest in Iguala, BBC NEws (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-29406630 ("The students from the
Ayotzinapa teacher training college were protesting against what they say are dis-
criminatory hiring practices for teachers which favour urban students over rural
ones."). Although there have been subsequent factual revelations between the
time of writing this article and the time of publication, none materially affect my
ultimate conclusion. As a result, for the purposes of this article, I assume the facts
as they were known to the public in March 2015.
3. Randal C. Archibold, Investigators in Mexico Detain Mayor and His Wife Over
Missing Students, N.Y. TIMi-s (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/
world/americas/Iguala-mayor-wife-missing-students-mexico.html?_r=0. Jesus Mu-
rillo Karam, the former Attorney General of Mexico, stated during a press confer-
ence that police officers indicated they were told to stop the students "'on the
mayor's orders."' Missing Mexico students: Iguala mayor 'ordered attack', BBC
Nizws (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-29732720.
4. Missing Mexico students: Iguala mayor 'ordered attack', supra note 3.
5. Gail Sullivan, Charred bodies found in 'the land of the wicked' may be missing
Mexican students, WASH. Pos-r (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2014/10/06/charred-bodies-found-in-the-land-of-the-wicked-
may-be-missing-mexican-students/.
6. Ludovica Laccino, Mexico's 43 Missing Students: Theories Behind Mysterious Dis-
appearance, INT'i Bus. TiMuls (Oct. 22, 2014, 3:43 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/
mexicos-43-missing-students-theories-behind-mysterious-disappearance-1471291.
7. Carrie Kahn, In Mexico, Protests Over Missing 43 Students Continue, NPR (Nov.
14, 2014, 4:23 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/11/14/364138347/in-mexico-protests-
over-missing-43-students-continue.
8. Missing Mexico students: Iguala mayor 'ordered attack', supra note 3.
9. Randal C. Archibold, Drug Gang Killed Students, Mexican Law Official Says, N.Y.
TiMI :S (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/world/americas/drug-
gang-killed-students-mexico-law-official-says.html?_r=0.
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students.10 The government later declared the remaining students
dead." t Abarca and Pineda Villa became fugitives on September 28,
2014,12 but were detained on November 4, 2014.13
Under Article One of the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (the Convention), "[n]o
one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance." 14 Ratifying nations
additionally have an obligation under Article Six to "take the necessary
measures to hold criminally responsible . . .[a]ny person who commits,
orders, solicits or induces the commission of, attempts to commit, is an
accomplice to or participates in an enforced disappearance.' 1 5 Moreo-
ver, under article twenty-three, "[e]ach State Party shall ensure that the
training of law enforcement personnel ... includes the necessary educa-
tion and information regarding the relevant provisions of this Conven-
tion, in order to . . . [p]revent the involvement of such officials in
enforced disappearances."' 16 Article Twenty-Three further requires
States Parties to ensure that government officials with knowledge of an
enforced disappearance report that information to appropriate
authorities.1 7
Mexico became a State Party to the Convention on March 18, 2008.18
Despite Mexico's ratification of the Convention, however, enforced dis-
appearances remain a significant problem in the country.' 9 Forty-three
college students' disappearance and subsequent murder in September
2014 (the Iguala Mass Kidnapping) marks the latest example of this epi-
demic in Mexico. Using the Iguala Mass Kidnapping as a case study, this
article addresses how Mexico is failing to meet its international human
rights obligations under the Convention. Part II provides background on
10. Tim Johnson, A charred eye socket provides proof that 43 missing Mexico students
are dead, McCLATCIIY DC NEws (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/
news/nation-world/world/latin-america/article24777175.html.
11. Eyder Peralta, Mexico Officially Declares 43 Missing Students Dead, NPR (Jan. 28,
2015, 9:49 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2015/01/28/382103750/mex
ico-officially-declares-43-missing-students-dead.
12. Fugitive Mexican mayor detained by police, Ai JAZEERA (Nov. 4, 2014, 3:38 PM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2014/11/fugitive-mexican-mayor-detained
-police-201411412363398559.html.
13. Mexican Authorities Unable to Charge Iguala Mayor and His Wife, "nrvi.SUR (Jan.
8, 2015), http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Mexican-Authorities-Unable-to-
Charge- Iguala-Mayor-and-His-Wife-20150108-0026.html.
14. Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance art.
1.1, adopted Dec. 20, 2006, 61 U.N.T.S. 488 (entered into force Dec. 23, 2010)
[hereinafter Convention].
15. Id. art. 6.1(a).
16. Id. art. 23.1(a).
17. Id. art. 23.3.
18. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disap-
pearance, Chapter IV Human Rights: 16, UNrrED NATIONS TREATY COLLECI-ON,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsgno=iv-I 6&chap
ter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
19. See Mexico: Thousands missing in drugs war says CNDH, BBC NEWS (Apr. 3,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12948840 ("Mexico's human
rights commission, CNDH, said 5,397 people had been reported missing since
President Felipe Calderon declared war on the drug cartels.").
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the Convention and highlights three of its particularly relevant articles:
one, six, and twenty-three. Part III addresses Mexico's compliance with
the Convention prior to the Iguala Mass Kidnapping. Part IV gives fac-
tual background on the Iguala Mass Kidnapping, including the protests
by the students that led to their attack, the attack itself, the students'
subsequent kidnapping, and the arrests of and charges against Abarca
and Pineda Villa. Part V discusses how the Iguala Mass Kidnapping vio-
lated articles one, six, and twenty-three of the Convention. Part VI out-
lines three recommendations for the Mexican government on how to
handle the Iguala Mass Kidnapping and prevent similar atrocities from
occurring in the future. Part VII concludes the article with a plea to the
Mexican government to take immediate action to show the international
community that it is ready to comply with the Convention's mandates.
At the outset, however, it is necessary to express the narrow purpose of
my research. The goal of this article is to address the specific failures of
Mexico's government in preventing, investigating, and prosecuting en-
forced disappearances, per its obligations under the Convention. In no
way whatsoever should this article be interpreted as condemning the peo-
ple of Mexico. To the contrary, I have had the tremendous privilege of
living only a few miles from the United States-Mexico border for the last
three years, and have had the enormous pleasure of taking two surfing
trips to Mexico. During both trips, I was charmed by Mexico's warm peo-
ple, enamored by its beautiful landscape, and overwhelmed by its deli-
cious and inexpensive cuisine. Mexico remains a wonderful place to visit,
particularly for surfers.20 Yet despite Mexico's status as a premier surf
destination, human rights violations perpetrated by the government re-
grettably continue to be a prevalent phenomenon there. Thus, while re-
maining inspired by the cultural and geographic offerings of Mexico, this
article's sole purpose is to highlight the continued failings of the Mexican
government to adhere to its international human rights obligations.
21
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF ALL PERSONS FROM ENFORCED
DISAPPEARANCE
To provide background on how the Iguala Mass Kidnapping violated
Mexico's obligations under the Convention, this section addresses the
20. See, e.g., MIKE PARISE, Tm- SURFFR'S GuIDE TO BAJA 3 (2d ed. 2005) ("1 can't tell
you how many times I've driven up to perfect point breaks that everyone knows
only to see an empty lineup .... The fact is, most of Baja is unsurfed most of the
time .... [a]nd it probably will stay uncrowded for a while."); see also ALLAN C.
WFISBECKER, IN SEARCH O1 CAIrAIN ZERO: A SURFER'S ROAI) TRIP BEYOND 1"1E
ENI) OF TI-E ROAD (2001) (telling the phenomenal true story of one surfer's road
trip through parts of Latin America, beginning in Mexico).
21. Moreover, it would be impossible to have an open dialogue about international
human rights without being able to value and respect cultural differences. I am
indebted to my partner Jes, whose family comes in part from Mexico, for providing
me with this insight during my writing process.
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Convention in depth and pays special attention to those articles that Mex-
ico violated through the incident: One, Six, and Twenty-three.
A. THE HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION
In 1978, during the thirty-third session of the United Nations (U.N.)
General Assembly, 22 the General Assembly indicated its deep concern
about global reports on involuntary disappearances of individuals at the
hands of law enforcement. 23 The General Assembly thus requested that
the Commission on Human Rights (the Commission) 24 "consider the
question of disappeared persons with a view to making appropriate rec-
ommendations. '25 This resolution has been noted as "the first instance in
which the General Assembly moved away from the country-specific ap-
proach that prevailed up until 1978, instead approaching the phenome-
non of disappearances as a universal and distinct issue."' 26 Subsequently,
in 1992, the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly proclaimed
the "Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disap-
pearance" (the Declaration).2 7 This resolution was passed out of concern
that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disap-
pearances occur, in the sense that persons are arrested, detained or
abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by
officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organ-
ized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the
support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Govern-
ment, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the
22. The General Assembly "is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative
organ of the U[.]N." About the General Assembly, GENFRA! ASSEMni3Y or ni
UNrIwD NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 11,
2015). All 193 U.N. members, including Mexico, participate in the General As-
sembly. Home, GENERAL ASSEM13LY OF TilE UNITED NATIONS, http://
www.un.org/en/ga/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015); Members of the United Nations,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.orglen/members/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
Every country in the General Assembly has one vote. About the General Assem-
bly, supra. While some General Assembly decisions require just a majority vote,
other more important decisions require a two-thirds majority vote. Id.
23. G.A. Res. 33/173, U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/173 (Dec. 20, 1978).
24. Fifty-three Member States comprised the Commission, which "was established in
1946 to weave the international legal fabric that protects our fundamental rights
and freedoms." Commission on Human Rights, OHCHR, http://www2.ohchr.org/
englishlbodies/chr/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015). The Commission was replaced by
the Human Rights Council in 2006. United Nations Human Rights Council,
OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx
(last visited Jan. 11, 2015); Commission on Human Rights, supra.
25. G.A. Res. 33/173, supra note 23, 2.
26. Nikolas Kyriakou, The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance and Its Contributions to International Human Rights
Law, with Specific Reference to Extraordinary Rendition, 13 ME.B. J. IN'L L. 424,
433 (2012).
27. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A.
Res. 47/133, U.N. Doc. A1RES471133 (Dec. 18, 1992) [hereinafter Declaration].
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law.28
The General Assembly opined that "enforced disappearance under-
mines the deepest values of any society committed to respect for the rule
of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and that the systematic
practice of such acts is of the nature of a crime against humanity. '29
Seeking to create a document that would set standards for preventing and
punishing enforced disappearances, 30 the drafters of the Declaration ulti-
mately set forth twenty-one articles.31 Notably, Articles One and Six of
the Convention loosely resemble Articles One and Six of the
Declaration. 32
In 2003, the Commission created an "Inter-sessional Open-ended
Working Group to elaborate a draft legally binding normative instrument
for the protection of all persons from enforced disappearance. ' 33 The
Convention was drafted over the course of three years, with participation
by more than seventy states in the working group sessions.34 The Human
Rights Council35 (the Council) adopted the Convention on June 29,
2006,36 and the General Assembly subsequently adopted the Convention
on December 20, 2006. 37 The Convention was opened for signature on
February 6, 2007 in Paris, France. 38 On that date, fifty-seven countries
signed the Convention. 39 Mexico was one of them.40
28. Id. preamble.
29. Id.
30. The Declaration states:
[W]hile the acts which comprise enforced disappearance constitute a vio-
lation of the prohibitions found in the [other] international instruments,
it is none the less important to devise an instrument which characterizes
all acts of enforced disappearance of persons as very serious offen[s]es
and sets forth standards designed to punish and prevent their
commission.
Id. Other relevant international treaties mentioned in the Declaration include the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Id.
31. See id.
32. Compare Convention, supra note 14, arts. 1, 6, with Declaration, supra note 27,
arts. 1, 6.
33. The Working Group and the Committee on Enforced Disappearance, OHCHR,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Disappearances/Pages/WG InternationalConven-
tion.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
34. Id.
35. "The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the United Na-
tions system responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human
rights around the globe and for addressing situations of human rights violations
and make recommendations on them." United Nations Human Rights Council,
supra note 24. Forty-seven Member States of the United Nations comprise the
Human Rights Council. Id.
36. See H.R.C. Res. 1/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/1/1 (June 29, 2006).
37. See G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006).
38. The Working Group and the Committee on Enforced Disappearance, supra note
33.
39. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Dis-
appearance, supra note 18.
40. Id.
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On December 23, 2010, the Convention went into effect 41 and became
what has been called "the first legally binding universal instrument that
creates an autonomous and non-derogable right not to be subjected to
enforced disappearance. '42 The Committee on Enforced Disappearances
(the Committee) was also created.43 The Committee is a "body of inde-
pendent experts that monitors implementation of the Convention by the
States Parties." 44 Specifically, all States parties are obliged to submit re-
ports to the Committee on how the rights are being implemented. States
must report within two years of ratifying the Convention. The Commit-
tee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommenda-
tions to the State party in the form of "concluding observations[."] 45 The
Committee meets twice annually.46
B. GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION
In addition to the three specific articles of the Convention that this
article addresses, some general information about the Convention is help-
ful to lay a framework for the purpose and design of the instrument. The
Convention contains forty-five articles, spanning a total of seventeen
pages.47 The preamble to the Convention indicates that States Parties to
the Convention are "[a]ware of the extreme seriousness of enforced dis-
appearance, which constitutes a crime and, in certain circumstances de-
fined in international law, a crime against humanity. ' 48 Article Two of
the Convention defines "enforced disappearance" as
the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
41. The Working Group and the Committee on Enforced Disappearance, supra note
33.
42. MARITM LoT VERMEUI FN, ENFORCEI) DISAPPIARANCF: DETERMINING STATE
RiSFONSIISILITY UNDER THE I NITERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PI.OTECIION
oF ALL PERSONS iROM ENFORCED DISAPPFARANCE 28 (School of Human Rights
Research Series, Vol. 51, 2012). The precise methods by which the Convention is
legally binding on States Parties are beyond the scope of this article but, generally
speaking, "[o]n the basis of the several procedures available to the [Committee on
Enforced Disappearances], the implementation and compliance of the States Par-
ties can be monitored. In particular, through the optional complaint procedures,
States Parties may be held responsible for concrete cases of enforced disappear-
ance." Id. at 30.
43. The Working Group and the Committee on Enforced Disappearance, supra note
33.
44. Committee on Enforced Disappearances, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/CED/Pages/CEDlntro.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2015). Under the Con-
vention, "[tihe Committee shall consist of ten experts of high moral character and
recognized competence in the field of human rights, who shall serve in their per-
sonal capacity and be independent and impartial." Convention, supra note 14, art.
26.1. Committee members are selected through election by States Parties and
serve four-year terms. Id. arts. 26.1, 26.4.
45. Committee on Enforced Disappearances, supra note 44.
46. Committee on Enforced Disappearances, supra note 44.
47. See Convention, supra note 14, arts. 1-44.
48. Id. preamble.
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followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law.49
Article Two's definition notably includes an element of sanctioning or
assent by the state as a necessary component.50 The Convention also pro-
vides, under article four, that every State Party must "take the necessary
measures to ensure that enforced disappearance constitutes an offen[s]e
under its criminal law."'' s Article Five goes on to state that enforced dis-
appearances are a crime under international law.52 States Parties addi-
tionally have an obligation under Article Twenty-Four to "take all
appropriate measures to search for, locate and release disappeared per-
sons and, in the event of death, to locate, respect and return their
remains." 53
Within two years of becoming a party to the Convention, States Parties
have a reporting requirement to the Committee.5 4 Specifically, states
must submit "a report on the measures taken to give effect to its obliga-
tions under this Convention."55 Upon considering this report, the Com-
mittee gives the reporting country "comments, observations or
recommendations. '"5 6 The State Party may then respond to the Commit-
tee's feedback.5 7 As discussed below, Mexico's State Party Report to the
Committee was comprehensive, but painted a deceptively positive picture
of how the country is addressing its obligations under the Convention.58
C. ARTICLES ONE, SIX, AND TWENTY-THREE
As discussed above, this article's focus is Mexico's violations of Articles
One, Six, and Twenty-Three of the Convention through the Iguala Mass
Kidnapping. Each of these provisions of the Convention is briefly out-
lined below.
1. Article One: The Absolute Prohibition on Enforced Disappearances
Article One of the Convention provides:
1. No one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance.
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war
or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification for enforced disappear-
49. Id. art 2.
50. Id.
51. Id. art. 4; see also id. art. 7.2.(a)-(b) (indicating that States Parties may establish
both mitigating and aggravating circumstances for enforced disappearances under
their penal codes).
52. Id. art. 5.
53. Id. art. 23.3.
54. Id. art 29.
55. Id. art. 29.1.
56. Id. art. 29.3.
57. Id. art. 29.3.
58. See infra Part III.B (discussing Mexico's purported compliance with articles two,
six, and twenty-three, prior to the Iguala Mass Kidnapping).
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ance.5 9 Under the strict language of Article One, then, enforced disap-
pearances are completely forbidden, without any excuse.60 Consistent
with this language, Mexico's 2014 State Party Report to the Committee
referred to Article One as an "[a]bsolute prohibition of enforced disap-
pearance."'6 1 As discussed below in Part V.A, the Iguala Mass Kidnap-
ping constituted an enforced disappearance within the definition used
in the Convention, and Mexico thus violated its Article One obligations
through this atrocity.
2. Article Six: Criminal Responsibility
Under Article Six of the Convention:
1. Each State Party shall take the necessary measures to hold crimi-
nally responsible at least:
(a) Any person who commits, orders, solicits or induces the commis-
sion of, attempts to commit, is an accomplice to or participates in an
enforced disappearance;
(b) A superior who:
(i) Knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly in-
dicated, that subordinates under his or her effective authority and
control were committing or about to commit a crime of enforced
disappearance;
(ii) Exercised effective responsibility for and control over activities
which were concerned with the crime of enforced disappearance;
and
(iii) Failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
his or her power to prevent or repress the commission of an en-
forced disappearance or to submit the matter to the competent au-
thorities for investigation and prosecution;
(c) Subparagraph (b) above is without prejudice to the higher stan-
dards of responsibility applicable under relevant international law to
a military commander or to a person effectively acting as a military
commander.
2. No order or instruction from any public authority, civilian, military
or other, may be invoked to justify an offen[s]e of enforced
disappearance. 62
Similar to the language prohibiting excused enforced disappearances in
Article One, 63 Article Six articulates that following orders is not a justifi-
cation for enforced disappearance. 6 4 As discussed below in Part V.B, the
59. Convention, supra note 14, art. 1.1.-2.
60. See id.
61. Comm. on Enforced Disappearances, Consideration of reports submitted by States
parties under article 29, paragraph 1, of the Convention, Reps. of States parties
due in 2012, Mexico, at 15, U.N. Doc. CED/C/MEX/I (Apr. 17, 2014) [hereinafter
State Party Report].
62. Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.-2.
63. See id. art. 1.2
64. Id. art. 6.2.
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Iguala Mass Kidnapping amounted to violations of three separate provi-
sions of Article Six of the Convention.
3. Article Twenty-Three: Training Requirements and Prohibition of
Ordering Enforced Disappearances
Article Twenty-Three of the Convention states:
1. Each State Party shall ensure that the training of law enforcement
personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and
other persons who may be involved in the custody or treatment of any
person deprived of liberty includes the necessary education and infor-
mation regarding the relevant provisions of this Convention, in order
to:
(a) Prevent the involvement of such officials in enforced
disappearances;
(b) Emphasize the importance of prevention and investigations in
relation to enforced disappearances;
(c) Ensure that the urgent need to resolve cases of enforced disap-
pearance is recognized.
2. Each State Party shall ensure that orders or instructions prescrib-
ing, authorizing or encouraging enforced disappearance are prohibited.
Each State Party shall guarantee that a person who refuses to obey
such an order will not be punished.
3. Each State Party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that
the persons referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article who have reason
to believe that an enforced disappearance has occurred or is planned
report the matter to their superiors and, where necessary, to the appro-
priate authorities or bodies vested with powers of review or remedy.65
Article Twenty-Three thus creates an obligation on States Parties to
train officials to prevent, investigate, and resolve enforced disappear-
ances.66 Additionally, like the prohibition against ordering enforced dis-
appearances in Article Six,67 Article Twenty-Three also prohibits officials
from ordering enforced disappearances. 68 As discussed below in Part
V.C, Mexico violated two separate subsections of Article Twenty-Three
with the Iguala Mass Kidnapping.
65. Id. art. 23.1-3.
66. Id. arts. 23.1.(a)-(c), 23.3. Failure to provide such trainings can constitute a viola-
tion of the Convention. See VERMEULFN, supra note 42, at 467 ("As training is
included as one of the provisions of the [Convention], state responsibility can be
determined if they fail to provide comprehensive training programmes on a regu-
lar basis.").
67. See Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.(a)-(b)(ii).
68. Id. art. 23.2.
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III. MEXICO'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION
PRIOR TO THE IGUALA MASS KIDNAPPINGS
To give context to Mexico's adherence to the Convention when the
Iguala Mass Kidnapping took place, this section discusses the extent to
which Mexico complied with the Convention before September 2014.
This section focuses on the period between February 6, 2007, the day
Mexico signed the Convention, 69 and September 26, 2014, the day the
forty-three students went missing.70
Mexico ratified the Convention on March 18, 2008.7 1 Since then, two
significant events have happened regarding Mexico's relationship to the
Convention prior to the Iguala Mass Kidnapping. First, in March 2011,
the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (the
"Working Group") conducted a visit to Mexico, 72 and subsequently pro-
duced a report on their findings (the Working Group Report). 73 Second,
on March 11, 2014, Mexico filed its first report on how the country is
implementing the Convention.74 Both of these important events are dis-
cussed below.
A. THE WORKING GROUP'S VISIT TO MEXICO AND
SUBSEQUENT REPORT
From March 18 to March 31, 2011, the Working Group visited Mexico
"to learn about Mexico's efforts in dealing with the issue of enforced dis-
appearances. '75 The Working Group was especially interested in assess-
ing "the status of the investigations of old and recent cases, steps taken to
prevent and eradicate enforced disappearances, what is being done to
combat impunity,[ 76] and other issues, including matters concerning truth,
69. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Dis-
appearance, supra note 18.
70. Missing Mexico students: Iguala mayor 'ordered attack', supra note 3.
71. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Dis-
appearance, supra note 18. As of January 2015, forty-four nations have become
States Parties to the Convention. See Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard,
OHCHR, http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2015) (with "Interna-
tional Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance"
selected). An additional fifty-five countries have signed the Convention. See id.
72. United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances con-
cludes visit to Mexico, OHCHR (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/News
Events/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=10907&LanglD=E. Country visits are
conducted only by invitation of a State Party. Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances-Country visits, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Is
sues/Disappearances/PagesVisits.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). At the time of
writing this article, the Working Group had conducted twenty-six country visits.
See id.
73. See H.R.C. Rep. of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappear-
ances, Addendum, Mission to Mexico, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/58/Add.2; 19th Sess.
(Dec. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Working Group Report].
74. See State Party Report, supra note 61.
75. United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances con-
cludes visit to Mexico, supra note 72.
76. Impunity is defined as "[e]xemption from punishment; immunity from the detri-
mental effects of one's actions." 876 BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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justice and reparations for victims of enforced disappearances. '77 The
Working Group Report centered on two time periods in Mexico's history,
"during which a great number of enforced disappearances took place. '78
The first time period was the "Dirty War," from the late 1960's to early
1980's. 79 Without minimizing the atrocities that took place during the
"Dirty War,"' 80 the focus of this article is the second time period of the
Working Group Report, "the current security situation in which multiple
cases of enforced disappearance have been and continue to be re-
ported."'' s It is significant to note, however, that the Working Group Re-
port indicated that these two time periods have similar patterns, including
"widespread impunity, withholding of the whole truth and lack of repara-
tion for the victims." 82
1. Inadequacies of the Legislative Framework in Mexico
The Working Group Report began by addressing some of the difficul-
ties with the current legislative framework in Mexico that creates
problems with adherence to the Convention.8 3 The Working Group Re-
port first noted that as of 2001, enforced disappearance has been a crime
under Mexico's C6digo Penal Federal (the Federal Criminal Code). 84
Specifically, under Article 215-A of the Federal Criminal Code, "[a] pub-
lic servant who-regardless of whether (s)he has participated in the legal
or illegal detention of an individual or various individuals-helps to se-
cure their secret detention or deliberately conceals information about it,
commits the offen[s]e of an enforced disappearance. ' 85 As indicated in a
February 2013 report by Human Rights Watch, however, there is an issue
with this article in the Federal Criminal Code: it "only imposes criminal
77. United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances con-
cludes visit to Mexico, supra note 72.
78. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 9.
79. Id. During the "Dirty War," "security forces carried out a policy of systematic
prosecution against students, indigenous peoples, peasants, social activists and any-
one suspected of being part of an opposition movement." Id. In this time period,
"[tihe serious abuses committed included student massacres in 1968 and 1971 and
the torture, execution and enforced disappearance of hundreds of dissidents and
suspected sympathizers." Id.
80. See supra note 79.
81. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 9.
82. Id.
83. See id. $ 10-15.
84. Id. % 13.
85. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MEXICO'S DISAPPEAREID: Tin, ENDURING COST OF A
CRISIS IGNORED 129 (2013) [hereinafter Mexico's Disappeared] (citing C6digo Pe-
nal Federal [CPF] [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, art. 215-A, Diario Oficial
de la Federaci6n [DO], 25 de Enero de 2013 (Mex.)). The author is indebted to
Human Rights Watch for their English translation of Article 215-A of the Federal
Criminal Code. Although Human Rights Watch cites to the January 25, 2013 pub-
lication of the Federal Criminal Code, the language of article 215-A has not
changed between that publication and the most recent publication of the Federal
Criminal Code. Compare CPF [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, art. 215-A,
DO, 25 de Enero de 2013 (Mex.), with CPF [Federal Criminal Code], as amended,
art. 215-A, DO, 14 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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responsibility for enforced disappearances on 'public servants' who par-
ticipate in or are aware of detentions. '86 Consistent with this interpreta-
tion, in addressing both Article 215-A of the Federal Criminal Code and
state legislative provisions prohibiting enforced disappearances, the
Working Group Report indicated that most of these legislative attempts
"refer merely to acts committed by public officials and exclude the possi-
bility that enforced disappearances may be perpetrated by organized
groups or individuals acting on behalf of the Government or with its di-
rect or indirect support, authorization or acquiescence. '87
The Working Group Report also noted that the Federal Criminal Code
definition of enforced disappearance is different than the one articulated
in the Declaration. 88 For the purposes of this article, it is additionally
important to note that the definition in the Federal Criminal Code is dif-
ferent from the one used in the Convention, which defines "enforced dis-
appearance" as including "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other
form of deprivation of liberty.., by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State."' 89 In an at-
tempt to address this inconsistency, "President Pefia Nieto has repeatedly
pledged to bring the definition of enforced disappearance in Mexico's
federal law into full compliance with international standards." 90 Despite
this pledge, the most current version of the Federal Criminal Code limits
the offense of enforced disappearance to public servants. 91
The Working Group Report additionally indicated that enforced disap-
pearance had been made criminal by only eight of the thirty-two federal
entities in Mexico.92 As of March 2014, an additional eleven federal enti-
ties have made enforced disappearance an offense, bringing the total
number of federal entities that prohibit enforced disappearance to
nineteen,93 alongside the federal prohibition against enforced disappear-
86. MEXIco's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 131.
87. Working Group Report, supra note 73, $ 13. In its February 2013 report on disap-
pearances in Mexico, Human Rights Watch commented that, because of the lim-
ited definition in the Federal Criminal Code, "prosecutors could claim they have
no authority to investigate or prosecute a whole subset of potential enforced disap-
pearance cases recognized under international law." Mi.xico's DISAPPIEAPED,
supra note 85, at 129.
88. Working Group Report, supra note 73, $ 13.
89. Convention, supra note 14, art. 2 (emphasis added).
90. MExico's DISAPE'ARED, supra note 85, at 131 (citing President Enrique Pefia
Nieto, I1 Sesi6n Extraordinaria del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Paiblica [Second
Session of the National Public Security Council], Mpxico, PRESIDENCIA lE LA
REPOBLICA (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/articulos-prensa/ii-se-
sion-extraordinaria-del-consejo-nacional-de-seguridad-publica/).
91. See CPF [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, art. 215-A, DO, 14 de Julio de 2014
(Mex.).
92. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 919 10, 13. At the time of the Working
Group Report, the eight states that had made enforced disappearance criminal
were: "Aguascalientes, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Durango, Federal District, Guerrero,
Nayarit and Oaxaca." Id. 91 13.
93. See State Party Report, supra note 61, 1 75. Enforced disappearance is an offense
"in the criminal codes of 17 of the country's states and in special laws in two of the
states." Id. $ 20 (internal citations omitted). The federal entities that list enforced
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ances in Article 215-A of the Federal Criminal Code.94 The Working
Group Report indicated, however, that "[t]he Federal Criminal Code and
the legislation of the states which have classified enforced disappearance
as an offen[s]e do not use the same definition, or the definition set out in
the Declaration. '95 Moreover, and as mentioned above, most of these
criminal codes do not account for the possibility of enforced disappear-
ances occurring by private parties acting with the government's authority
or encouragement. 96 As with the Federal Criminal Code, such limited
definitions of enforced disappearance are additionally inconsistent with
the definition in the Convention. 97
Another issue with the various codifications of enforced disappear-
ances across Mexico is that "[p]enalties vary according to the jurisdiction,
and are not necessarily proportionate to the seriousness of the offen[s]e
when compared with that of other offen[s]es such as abduction. ' 98 Per-
haps even more troubling, though, were the Working Group's comments
on the difficulties of enforcing existing laws on enforced disappear-
ances. 99 The Working Group noted that, during its visit to Mexico,
[t]he majority of Government officials, NGOs and victims of en-
forced disappearance highlighted the problem of the lack of vertical
and horizontal coordination among Government authorities in the
prevention and investigation of enforced disappearances and the
search for disappeared persons. In the Working Group's meetings
with the federal authorities, it was explained that some of the tasks
disappearance in their criminal codes include: "Aguascalientes, Baja California,
Campeche, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Colima, Durango, Federal District, Guanajuato,
Hidalgo, Michoacin, Nayarit, Nuevo Le6n, Oaxaca, Puebla, San Luis Potosi and
Zacatecas." Id. 91 20 n.1. The federal entities that list enforced disappearance in
their special laws are Guerrero and Chiapas. Id. 20 n.2. The Working Group
opined that, in the federal entities where enforced disappearance is not an offense,
enforced disappearances are treated like abuse of authority, unlawful ag-
gravated deprivation of liberty, abuse of public authority, offen[s]e
against justice, unlawful detention, abduction or a combination of these
offen[s]es. However, either such offen[s]es do not have the necessary
scope to encompass enforced disappearances or the severity of the pen-
alty is inappropriate.
Working Group Report, supra note 73, 9 14. Though not a central point of discus-
sion in this article, those thirteen federal entities that do not include enforced dis-
appearance in their criminal codes arguably violate article four of the Convention,
which mandates that "[e]ach State Party shall take the necessary measures to en-
sure that enforced disappearance constitutes an offen[s]e under its criminal law."
Convention, supra note 14, art. 4.
94. See CPF [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, art. 215-A, DO, 14 de Julio de 2014
(Mex.).
95. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 9 13. In short, "[t]he inconsistencies in the
definition of the crime of enforced disappearance with the Declaration and other
relevant international instruments and the fact that the vast majority of the states
have not yet criminalized enforced disappearances as an autonomous offense con-
tribute to impunity." United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances concludes visit to Mexico, supra note 72.
96. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 9 13.
97. See supra text accompanying note 89.
98. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 9 13.
99. See id. 9 12.
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related to enforced disappearances fall within the competence of the
states. Yet, the state authorities asserted that the Federal Govern-
ment has responsibility for central issues such as the fight against
organized crime, abductions and guaranteeing security through the
presence of the Federal Police, the army and the navy. 100
Thus, the confusion among state and federal authorities, as well as the
inconsistencies within Mexican law, make it difficult for Mexico to adhere
to its international obligations under the Convention. 1 1
2. The Current State of Enforced Disappearances in Mexico
The Working Group Report next addressed "[e]nforced disappear-
ances in the current security context. 102 This section of the Working
Group Report and the sections that precede it contain two phenomena
that are relevant to this article. The first is the prevalence of enforced
disappearances by or with consent from public officials. The second is the
failure of the Mexican government to prevent, investigate, and prosecute
enforced disappearances. Both are discussed below.
a. The Prevalence of Enforced Disappearances by or with Consent
from Public Officials
The Working Group Report noted that, despite the increase in violence
from organized crime in the country, "not all disappeared persons were
abducted by independent organized criminal groups; the State is also in-
volved in enforced disappearances in Mexico."'1 3 The Working Group
"received specific, detailed and reliable information on enforced disap-
pearances carried out by public authorities, criminal groups or individuals
with direct or indirect support from public officials."' 1 4 Specifically, at
the time of the Working Group Report in 2011, organizations in Mexico
estimated that over 3,000 enforced disappearances had occurred in Mex-
ico since 2006.105 The Working Group indicated that "some of these
100. Id. Consistent with the confusion as to who has jurisdiction over enforced disap-
pearances, the Working Group Report later stated:
Federal authorities maintained that [ninety-two] percent of offen[sjes
committed in Mexico come under local and not federal jurisdiction.
Many federal authorities claim that federal institutions tend to be well
equipped and have trained professional staff, while local institutions tend
to be weak, have fewer professional development opportunities and
scant human and financial resources.
Id. , 22.
101. See id. $ 12 (noting that the duties of local and federal officials are diluted by
"[tihe division of power, absence of a general law regulating all aspects of enforced
disappearance, existence of security forces at the federal, state and municipal
levels and the possibility for offen[sles to be investigated at either the federal or
state level depending on the identity of the alleged perpetrator").
102. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 9 16.
103. Id. 1 17.
104. Id.
105. Id. J 20. Another report indicated an even more staggering number, stating that
"[mlore than 9,000 people have gone missing since 2013, under the administration
of Pefia Nieto." Emilio Godoy, Forced Disappearances are Humanitarian Crisis in
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cases could be described as enforced disappearances due to the direct or
indirect involvement of public officials."' 1 6
Consistent with the Working Group Report's findings, in its February
2013 report on disappearances in Mexico, Human Rights Watch stated
that it had kept track of almost 250 disappearances in the country since
the year 2007.107 The organization indicated that "[i]n more than 140 of
these cases, evidence suggests that these were enforced disappearances-
meaning that state agents participated directly in the crime, or indirectly
through support or acquiescence."10 8 Most heinously, "[t]hese crimes
were committed by members of every security force involved in public
security operations.' 0 9 Specifically, the organization "documented more
than 20 cases of enforced disappearances perpetrated by members of the
Navy in June and July 2011,"' 10 "found strong evidence in 95 cases that
local police participated directly or indirectly in enforced disappear-
ances,"' 1 and "found strong evidence that 13 enforced disappearances
were carried out by federal police."'112 The organization additionally
noted that public security officials "sometimes act[ed] in conjunction with
organized crime." 3 Over sixty cases in particular provided "compelling
evidence of cooperation between security forces and organized crime in
disappearances."' 1 4
Thus, even prior to the tragic events in Iguala in the fall of 2014, en-
forced disappearances were a prevalent occurrence in Mexico by every
level of public security forces. The Iguala Mass Kidnapping continued
this unfortunate trend.
b. The Failure of the Mexican Government to Prevent, Investigate,
and Prosecute Enforced Disappearances
This subsection addresses the Working Group's findings with regard to
Mexico's efforts towards the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of
enforced disappearances in the country.
i. Prevention
With regard to preventing enforced disappearances, the Working
Group quite frighteningly indicated that, during the time it spent in Mex-
ico conducting its country visit, it "did not receive any information about
the existence and implementation of mechanisms monitoring the use of
Mexico, Niw AM. MELDIA (Jan. 26, 2015), http://newamericamedia.org/2015/01/
forced-disappearances-are-humanitarian-crisis-in-mexico.php.
106. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 20.
107. Mixico's DISAPPE'ARED, supra note 85, at 1.
108. Id.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 18.
111. Id. at 26 (internal citations omitted).
112. Id. at 28.
113. Id. at I (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 29
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force by police and military personnel." 115 Additionally, when the Work-
ing Group Report was written, "only the Federal District police force
ha[d] legislation and regulations governing the use of force." 6 Other
government agencies had only guidelines on the use of force."17
Since the publication of the Working Group Report, however, Mex-
ico's federal government passed "The Protocols for the Use of Force, the
Preservation of Evidence, and the Presentation of Detainees to the Au-
thorities" (the Protocols). 18 Effective April 23, 2012, the Protocols "are
to be followed by the army, navy, air force, federal police, and the Public
Prosecutor's Office . . . and establish when the use of lethal force can be
applied."11 9 Under the Protocols, force may be used by these govern-
ment agencies only as a last resort. 120 This legislation particularly pro-
vides that "the armed forces will no longer be able to shoot people who
evade, flee, or attempt to escape from them, unless such persons seriously
resist authority or present imminent danger of death or serious injury to
others.' 21 Although the Protocols do not apply to local police,1 22 they
are a welcome step for Mexico's federal government, as "such legislation
is essential for limiting the use of excessive force and preventing enforced
disappearances. "123
ii. Investigation
During the Working Group's visit to Mexico, it "observed severe
problems relating to investigations into enforced disappearances, includ-
ing omissions, delays and lack of due diligence.' 24 Worst of all, "[m]any
prosecution services refuse[d] to handle complaints of enforced disap-
pearances, agreeing only to draw up a detailed report of events without
launching a proper investigation.' 125 Human Rights Watch similarly
"found that prosecutors routinely fail to conduct preliminary inquiries or
open investigations immediately after disappearances are reported.' 26
In many of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch, the families
of enforced disappearance victims were told that they needed to wait
three days before an investigation could be opened. 127 Other times, vic-
115. Working Group Report, supra note 73, $ 29.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Norma Gutierrez, Mexico: Federal Government Regulates Use of Force by Military
and Police, LIBR. OF CONGRESS (May 10, 2012), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet
/Iloc news?disp3_1205403140_text (citing Doris G6mora & Silvia Otero, Regulan






123. Working Group Report, supra note 73, $ 29.
124. Id. 1 34.
125. Id.
126. Mixico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 35.
127. Id. at 36.
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tims' families were told that an investigation would not be worthwhile
because "the missing person had most likely been detained by security
forces, and would eventually be handed over to justice officials or re-
leased without charge."'1 28 This problem is compounded by the finding of
the Working Group that "[m]any authorities, both civil and military, re-
fuse to work with the investigating authorities. 1129
Regrettably, both the Working Group Report and the February 2013
Human Rights Watch report indicated that enforced disappearance vic-
tims are often so fearful of speaking to authorities about their exper-
iences that the disappearances go unreported. 130 According to the
Working Group, in many instances, "the relatives of the victims of en-
forced disappearance have been subject to intimidation, threats and re-
prisals because they insisted that a proper investigation be carried
out.' 13 1 The Working Group also received information from multiple
sources that "authorities-particularly the prosecution services-try to
discredit disappeared persons by claiming that they have been involved
with criminal groups, without providing any evidence or conducting any
investigation to prove otherwise."'132 Human Rights Watch similarly
noted the prevalence of blaming the enforced disappearance victim for
involvement in criminal activity:
[A]ccording to nearly every family interviewed by Human Rights
Watch, law enforcement and prosecutors' reflexive assumption in
disappearance cases is that the victim was targeted for belonging to a
criminal group. Authorities repeatedly embraced this theory, and in-
deed often voiced it to families, before undertaking a preliminary
investigation into the case.133
The organization indicated that the assumption that the victim was in-
volved in crime was frequently cited as a rationale for not opening up an
investigation. 34 Moreover, in addressing what it described as "prevailing
impunity" towards enforced disappearances, the Working Group Report
indicated that "many cases which could come under the scope of the of-
fen[s]e of enforced disappearance are reported and investigated as differ-
ent offen[s]es, or are not even considered to be offen[s]es."' 135 More
specifically, the Working Group
received many reports of cases in which unlawful or arbitrary depri-
vation of liberty was classified as a different offen[s]e, such as abduc-
tion or abuse of authority, or persons were simply considered
'missing' or 'lost' (particularly groups such as women, children and
migrants); proper investigations are not being conducted to rule out
128. Id.
129. Working Group Report, supra note 73, T 34.
130. See id. $ 33; Mizxico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 40-42.
131. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 33.
132. Id.
133. Mrxico's DISAPPEARUD, supra note 85, at 40.
134. Id.
135. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 18.
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the possibility that such persons might be victims of enforced
disappearance. 136
Put simply, investigation into enforced disappearances remains wanting
in Mexico. So much so, in fact, that the Working Group Report posited
that Mexico is either "unwilling or unable to conduct effective investiga-
tions into cases of enforced disappearance."'' 37 This leads to a lack of
trust in the government by victims, 138 and makes it difficult to accurately
state how many enforced disappearances have taken place in Mexico. 139
iii. Prosecution
The Working Group Report indicated that prosecution for enforced
disappearances is rare in Mexico. 140 In fact, "[t]he Working Group was
only informed of two convictions currently under appeal for the offen[s]e
of enforced disappearance, despite the high number of offen[s]es re-
ported."'141 Unfortunately, the dearth of convictions reported by the
Working Group comports with a 2011 report by Human Rights Watch,
which indicated that, at the time the report was written, "not a single
military officer ha[d] been convicted for the crime of enforced disappear-
ance in the military justice system. a142 Even more amazing is that, of all
the cases heard by the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico 143 between
1995 and 2011, only one involved enforced disappearance. 44 That case,
however, "did not address the criminal liability of the defendants or the
rights of the victims, but involved a constitutional challenge over the ap-
plication of an international treaty."'1 45
In addition to Mexico's inadequate legislative framework 146 and failure
136. Id.
137. Id. $ 76.
138. See id. ("The victims of enforced disappearances have no faith in the justice sys-
tem, prosecution services, the police or Armed Forces.").
139. Id. 21 ("A potential enforced disappearance may only be ruled out after a com-
plete, independent and impartial investigation. Therefore, the number of cases of
enforced disappearance cannot be fully established without proper
investigation.").
140. Id. $ 32.
141. Id.
142. HUMAN RiGi-rs WATCH, NEITniER RIGirrs NOR SECURITY: KILLINGS, TOwruRE,
AND DISAPPEARANCES IN MEXICO'S "WAR ON DRUGS" 134 (2011). The report
also indicated that "[m]ilitary prosecutors routinely fail to conduct adequate inves-
tigations into alleged enforced disappearances, including not interviewing key wit-
nesses, not visiting the crime scene, and failing to pursue possible leads." Id.; see
also MExico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 134-42 (discussing the inadequa-
cies of Mexico's military justice system with regard to prosecuting enforced
disappearances).
143. "The Supreme Court of the Nation is the Highest Court of Justice of Mdxico ....
[l]ts main function is to enforce the law and preserve the order established by the
Supreme Law: the Constitution of the Mexican States." The Supreme Court of
Justice in Mexico, EXI'LORANDO Mi'xico, http://www.explorandomexico.com/
about-mexico/10/406/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (emphasis omitted).
144. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 1 32.
145. Id.
146. See supra Part III.A.1.
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to investigate enforced disappearances, 147 one of the reasons for the low
number of prosecutions for enforced disappearances is the classification
of offenses.1 48 According to the Working Group Report, "[o]ften, the
prosecution services submit cases as minor offen[s]es instead of the of-
fen[s]e of enforced disappearance (in those federal entities where the act
has been classified as an offen[s]e) and judges do not use their powers to
reclassify the offen[s]es. ' '149 Another reason is the "dilution of responsi-
bility and the ambiguities regarding jurisdiction" of investigating and
prosecuting enforced disappearances. 150 In its 2013 report, Human
Rights Watch noted that state and federal prosecutors use this dilution to
"preemptively decline to investigate cases, transferring them instead to
counterparts."1 5 1 This is often done even before determining whether the
prosecutor has jurisdiction over the case. 152 According to Human Rights
Watch, this "suggests that [prosecutors] are more concerned with avoid-
ing adding cases to their docket than fulfilling their obligation to investi-
gate these serious crimes.' 53
Thus, prosecution for enforced disappearances remains scant in Mex-
ico. As discussed below in Part IV.B, this trend was regrettably contin-
ued by the failure of federal authorities to prosecute Mayor Abarca and
his wife Pineda Villa for the crime of enforced disappearance under the
Federal Criminal Code following the events of the Iguala Mass
Kidnapping.
3. The Working Group's Recommendations to Mexico
At the conclusion of the Working Group Report, the Working Group
set forth a number of recommendations for Mexico.' 54 At the outset, and
in an apparent attempt to alert Mexico's government of the significance
of the problem of enforced disappearances in the country, the Working
Group recommended "that the scale of the problem of enforced disap-
pearances should be recognized as the first step required to implement
comprehensive and effective measures for its eradication."' 55 It is inter-
esting to note that such strong language does not always appear in the
Working Group's reports following a country visit. For example, in the
147. See supra Part III.A.2.b.ii.
148. See Working Group Report, supra note 73, $ 34.
149. Id. A similar phenomenon prevails in Mexico's military justice system. See ME-x
ico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 138 ("Human Rights Watch found strong
evidence in several cases that military prosecutors had charged members of the
military alleged to have committed enforced disappearances for lesser crimes.").
150. MExico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 58; see also id. $1 12 (noting that, among
other factors, the "existence of security forces at the federal, state and municipal
levels and the possibility for offen[s]es to be investigated at either the federal or
state level depending on the identity of the alleged perpetrator dilute the responsi-
bility of the federal and local authorities").
151. Mi-xico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 58.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 9$9 79-113.
155. Id. %1 80.
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Working Group's report after its country visit to Spain, no such language
regarding the Spanish government's recognition of the scale of the issue
of enforced disappearances was included in the Working Group's recom-
mendations. 156 The language in the Working Group's report following its
trip to Mexico, by contrast, divulges the Working Group's opinion that
the Mexican government is unaware of just how prevalent the problem of
enforced disappearances is in the country.157
Although the Working Group made a number of specific recommenda-
tions to the Mexican government, a few are particularly pertinent here.
First, the Working Group recommended that "that the offen[s]e of en-
forced disappearance should be included in the criminal codes of all
states and that a comprehensive law on enforced or involuntary disap-
pearances should be adopted without delay.1 58 As discussed above in
Part III.A.1, as of March 2014, only nineteen of Mexico's thirty-two fed-
eral entities have made enforced disappearance an offense.1 59 Second,
the Working Group advised "that the definition of enforced disappear-
ance in criminal law should be brought into line with that contained in the
Declaration and other relevant international instruments. '"1 60 Third, the
Working Group prescribed "the adoption of legislation, standards and
protocols to regulate the use of force by the army and all police forces as
a preventive measure against enforced disappearances.' 6 1 As discussed
above in Part III.A.2.b.i, in April 2012, Mexico adopted the Protocols,
which apply to military and federal police, but not to local police.' 62
Fourth, the Working Group recommended "that coordination among the
authorities responsible for public safety should be ensured in order to
prevent and investigate enforced disappearances.' 63 Fifth, and finally,
the Working Group advised "that the right to justice and the fight against
impunity should be guaranteed through judicial training and the enforce-
ment of the law, the adoption of protocols for investigations and the pro-
tection of witnesses and relatives." 164
In sum, the Working Group Report paints a grim picture of the preva-
lence of enforced disappearances in Mexico. Such disappearances are
widespread, and are often perpetrated by government officials. Investi-
gatory systems are severely lacking, and prosecution for this crime is a
rarity. As discussed below, however, Mexico's State Party Report to the
156. See H.R.C. Rep. of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappear-
ances, Addendum, Mission to Spain, 1 67, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/49/Add.1; 27th
Sess. (July 2, 2014).
157. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 80.
158. Id.
159. See State Party Report, supra note 61, $ 75.
160. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 1 87.
161. Id. $1 91.
162. See Gutierrez, supra note 118 (citing Doris G6mora & Silvia Otero, supra note
118).
163. Working Group Report, supra note 73, 91 92.
164. Id. 1 96.
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Committee contains a much different depiction of how Mexico is adher-
ing to its international obligations under the Convention.
B. MEXICO'S 2014 STATE PARTY REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE
Under Article Twenty-Nine of the Convention, every State Party must
submit a report to the Committee on how it is adhering to the Conven-
tion within two years of the Convention being effective for that State
Party. 165 As mentioned above, Mexico ratified the Convention on March
18, 2008,166 and the Convention became effective on December 23,
2010.167 On March 11, 2014, Mexico filed its "Reports of States parties
due in 2012" (State Party Report). 168 Spanning forty-four pages, the
State Party Report gives general information regarding Mexico's stated
adherence to the Convention and discusses how the country is purport-
edly adhering to each specific provision of the Convention.169 The discus-
sion below addresses both Mexico's alleged adherence to the Convention
generally and Mexico's stated adherence to the Convention articles this
paper focuses on: One, Six, and Twenty-Three.
1. Mexico's Claim of General Adherence to the Convention
The State Party Report's introduction quite optimistically states that
"Mexico is complying with this international obligation at a time when
there has been significant progress in the advancement and protection of
and respect for human rights in the country.' 170 It subsequently indi-
cates, however, that "Mexico has recognized the major challenges it faces
in the area of human rights,"117 1 specifying that "[e]nforced disappear-
ance, together with the delicate task of providing support to victims' fam-
ilies and organizations of victims, is one of the most significant challenges
facing Mexico."'1 72 Noting that "[i]ncreased efforts have . . . been made
to combat enforced disappearances,"' 173 the State Party Report details a
number of measures to comply with the Convention's obligations.
74
The State Party Report additionally addressed the recommendations
made by the Working Group Report, 175 discussed above in Part III.A.
165. Convention, supra note 14, art. 29.1.
166. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disap-
pearance, supra note 18.
167. The Working Group and the Committee on Enforced Disappearance, supra note
33.
168. See State Party Report, supra note 61, 1 1. It is noteworthy that Mexico filed the
State Party Report two years late.
169. See id. at $9 1-44.
170. Id. 2.
171. Id. $ 4.
172. Id. T 5.
173. Id. 1 4.
174. See id. 1 6-12. For instance, the State Party Report indicated that "[i]n October
2013, in the area of legislative harmonization, the Senate considered a presidential
initiative to bring the definition of the offen[s]e of enforced disappearance into
line with international standards." Id. T 9.
175. See id. 9 13.
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Specifically, the State Party Report indicated that "the Government is
determined to comply with the recommendations contained in the 2011
report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappear-
ances, recognizing that such disappearances are among the most serious
and painful offen[s]ses against personal dignity and also infringe other
fundamental rights.' 76 The introduction concludes by asserting that
"[t]he current Mexican legal system provides greater protection for
human rights than ever before, with public policies based on international
standards and a Government that has the will and desire to take preven-
tive and punitive measures in relation to the offen[s]e of enforced disap-
pearance in accordance with international law."'1 77 Unfortunately, such
protections were not strong enough to protect the forty-three victims of
the Iguala Mass Kidnapping, which occurred a mere six months following
Mexico's filing of the State Party Report. 178
2. Mexico's Stated Adherence to Article One
As discussed above in Part II.C.1, Article One of the Convention com-
pletely prohibits enforced disappearances with no exceptions or justifica-
tions.179 In addressing Mexico's adherence to its Article One obligations,
the State Party Report indicates:
In Mexico, enforced disappearance is defined as a serious offen[s]e
in the Federal Criminal Code and in the codes or special legislation
of 19 of the country's federal entities. Furthermore, the prohibition
of enforced disappearance is provided for in the Constitution, where
it is listed as one of the circumstances in which the State may in no
case suspend guarantees.' 80
The State Party Report then addresses how the Mexican Constitution
prohibits any restriction of Mexican citizens' right to freedom from en-
forced disappearance.1 81 To implement this prohibition, "[a]ny decrees
issued by the executive power during the restriction or suspension [of the
exercise of rights] are to be immediately reviewed ex officio by the Su-
preme Court of Justice, which is to rule as soon as possible on their con-
stitutionality and validity.' 82 While Mexico's purported compliance with
Article One as described in the State Party Report is directly aligned with
the mandates of that Article,183 it proved insufficient to prevent the
atrocities of the Iguala Mass Kidnapping.
176. Id.
177. Id. 1 14.
178. See Charred bodies found in 'the land of the wicked' may be missing Mexican stu-
dents, supra note 5; The Working Group and the Committee on Enforced Disap-
pearance, supra note 33.
179. See Convention, supra note 14, art. 1.1-2.
180. State Party Report, supra note 61, 75.
181. See id. 77.
182. Id. 9 78.
183. Compare id. $1 75-78, with Convention, supra note 14, art. 1.1.-2.
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3. Mexico's Stated Adherence to Article Six
As addressed above in Part II.C.2, Article Six of the Convention man-
dates that States Parties hold those who have any involvement in en-
forced disappearances criminally responsible. 184 Article Six further
directs that following orders does not excuse the perpetration of an en-
forced disappearance.' 85 In addressing Mexico's adherence to this article
of the Convention, the State Party Report notes that a
proposed amendment to Article 215 of the Federal Criminal
Code[ 186 ] submitted to Congress on 22 October 2013 would codify
the criminal responsibility of superior officials who fail to use their
authority to prevent the offen[s]e of enforced disappearance. This
would penalize government officials who are aware that their subor-
dinates have committed the offen[s]e, regardless of whether they
themselves have been active participants. 187
This amendment would therefore apparently bring the Federal Crimi-
nal Code in line with subsection (b) of the first part of Article Six of the
Convention, which puts a duty on States Parties to hold superiors crimi-
nally liable for enforced disappearances by their subordinates, even if the
superiors had only mere knowledge of the enforced disappearance.188
The amendment would allegedly "also provide for the criminal respon-
sibility of any person taking part in the enforced disappearance with the
consent or backing of a public servant or in his or her support."'189 That
clause appears to address the second part of Article Six, which indicates
that "[n]o order or instruction from any public authority, civilian, military
or other, may be invoked to justify an offen[s]e of enforced disappear-
ance."'190 This portion of the amendment also seems to supplement Mex-
ico's existing criminal legal structure, which "does not provide for the
principle of due obedience to exempt from punishment a subordinate
who receives an order from a superior official. Both perpetrators and
accomplices are criminally responsible."' 91 Finally, this amendment
would provide that there is no alternative to imprisonment for those who
commit enforced disappearances. 192 This appears to be consistent with
the general mandate in the first part of Article Six of the Convention that
States Parties must hold those who perpetrate enforced disappearances
criminally liable.193
184. Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.
185. Id. art. 6.2.
186. See supra Part I1.A.1 for a discussion of article 215-A of the Federal Criminal
Code.
187. State Party Report, supra note 61, $ 118.
188. Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.(b).
189. State Party Report, supra note 61, 1 119.
190. Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.2.
191. State Party Report, supra note 61, 1 120.
192. Id. % 121.
193. Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.
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The first part of the amendment, which addresses superior liability for
enforced disappearance regardless of the superior's involvement in such
disappearance, is now reflected in the most recently published version of
the Federal Criminal Code. 194 Unfortunately, however, the second and
third parts of the amendment, which respectively address liability for
those acting with consent of public officials and mandatory imprisonment
for the crime of enforced disappearance, 95 have not been incorporated
into the Federal Criminal Code. 196 Thus, although the Federal Criminal
Code makes superiors criminally responsible regardless of their participa-
tion in an enforced disappearance, 197 the other two portions of the
amendment, which would have brought Article 215-A of the Federal
Criminal Code into alignment with Article Six of the Convention, did not
go into effect. Although it is unlikely that additional statutory compli-
ance with the Convention would have prevented the Iguala Mass Kidnap-
ping,1 98 in failing to pass this amendment, Mexico missed a significant
opportunity to take an important step toward compliance with its interna-
tional obligations.
4. Mexico's Stated Adherence to Article Twenty-Three
Finally, as addressed above in Part II.C.3, Article Twenty-Three of the
Convention mandates that States Parties prevent, investigate, and resolve
enforced disappearances through training of officials. 199 Article Twenty-
Three additionally proscribes the ordering of disappearances by offi-
cials.200 In discussing Mexico's alleged compliance with Article Twenty-
Three, the State Party Report outlines a number of different training ef-
forts that take place across different government entities in the coun-
try.20 1 Although the State Party Report does not go into significant detail
about these trainings, 202 it does address a cooperation agreement be-
tween Mexico and the International Committee of the Red Cross,203 an
internal enforced disappearances working group created by Mexico's
194. See CPF [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, art. 215-A, DO, 14 de Julio de 2014
(Mex.) (emphasis added) ("Comete el delito de desaparici6n forzada de personas,
el servidor ptiblico que, independientemente de que haya participado en la deten-
ci6n legal o ilegal de una o varias personas, propicie o mantenga dolosamente su
ocultamiento bajo cualquier forma de detenci6n.").
195. State Party Report, supra note 61, 1 119, 121.
196. See CPF [Federal Criminal Code], arts. 215-A-D.
197. Id. art. 215-A.
198. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formula-
tion of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 G7o. L.J. 949,
951 (2003) ("Having a punishment system does deter. But there is growing evi-
dence to suggest skepticism about the criminal law's deterrent effect-that is,
skepticism about the ability to deter crime through the manipulation of criminal
law rules and penalties.").
199. Convention, supra note 14, arts. 23.1.(a)-(c), 23.3.
200. Id. art. 23.2.
201. State Party Report, supra note 61, 226-44.
202. See id.
203. Id. 11 226-28.
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government,20 4 and human rights trainings in place for the armed forces,
security forces, migration authorities, and judiciary. 20 5 Thus, while Mex-
ico appears to have some internal mechanisms in place to ensure that
government officials are trained in the topic of enforced disappearance,
they were insufficient to prevent the Iguala Mass Kidnapping.
Another interesting but troublesome note is that, although the State
Party Report spends three pages discussing trainings within the country
that purportedly bring Mexico in alignment with its Article Twenty-Three
obligations, it does not address article twenty-three's prohibition on or-
dering enforced disappearances. 20 6 Given that the Iguala Mass Kidnap-
ping began with an order by the mayor of Iguala and his wife to local
police forces to stop the protesting college students,20 7 the State Party
Report's silence on the issue is worrisome, to say the least.
In sum, though the State Party Report paints a relatively rosy picture
of Mexico's adherence to the Convention, any such appearance of com-
pliance with its international obligations was completely shattered by the
Iguala Mass Kidnapping. This atrocity, addressed in detail below, oc-
curred a mere six months following Mexico's filing of the State Party
Report.
IV. THE IGUALA MASS KIDNAPPING
To address how the Iguala Mass Kidnapping demonstrated Mexico's
failure to adhere to its obligations under the Convention, this part of the
article focuses on the kidnapping's factual details, which can be divided
into four sections: the protests by the students that led to their attack, the
attack on the students itself, the subsequent kidnapping of the students,
and the arrests of and charges against Abarca and Pineda Villa.
A. THE STUDENT PROTESTS
On September 26, 2014, students from The Raul Isidro Burgos Normal
Rural School,20 8 a teacher training college in Tixtla, Mexico, assembled in
Iguala to protest hiring practices they believed to be discriminatory.20 9
Students from the college were "known for militant and radical protests
that often involve hijacking buses and delivery trucks. '210 For instance,
204. Id. 229-31.
205. Id. IT 232-44.
206. Id. I 226-4.
207. Missing Mexico students: Iguala mayor 'ordered attack', supra note 3.
208. This school "is one of 16 institutions around Mexico that arose following Mexico's
revolution nearly a century ago with the aim of training teachers to raise literacy
and standards of living among the rural poor." Tim Johnson, At college of missing
Mexican students, history of revolutionary zeal, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 13,
2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2014/1013/At-college-of-missing
-Mexican-students-history-of-revolutionary-zeal.
209. See Mexican students missing after protest in Iguala, supra note 2; id.
210. Jose Antonio Rivera, Mass grave found as Mexico probes town's violence, DE-
TRorr NEws (Oct. 5, 2014, 11:01 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/na
tion/2014/1 0/05/mass-grave-found-mexico-probes-towns-violence/16763339/.
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In December 2011, two students from Aytozinapa died in a clash
with police on the highway that leads to the Pacific coast resort of
Acapulco. Students had allegedly hijacked buses and blocked the
road to press demands for more funding and assured jobs after grad-
uation. Two state police officers were charged in the shootings.
During that confrontation, students apparently set fire to pumps at
a gas station on the highway when federal and state police moved in
to quell the protest, and a gas station employee later died of burns
suffered in the attack.2 11
Some reports indicated that, on the day of the Iguala Mass Kidnapping,
the students "came to Iguala to raise funds for a planned protest against
hiring practices that, in their view, favor urban students over rural
ones."2 12 Other reports stated that the students "hoped to raise money
for a delegation to travel to Mexico City to take part in an annual march
that commemorates the Oct[ober] 2, 1968, Tlatelolco massacre. '2 13 Re-
gardless of their motivation, over one hundred students traveled to
Iguala, Mexico on September 26, 2014.214 The students were "all boys in
their late teens and early twenties. '21 5
Mere blocks from where the students were conducting their protest on
that fateful day in September 2014, Pineda Villa, wife of then Iguala
Mayor Abarca, was scheduled to speak at a party. 216 Her speech, regard-
ing "her activities as the head of the local family services office, ' 217 was
to be delivered at what has been described as "a party she was throwing
in honor of herself. ' 218 One account indicated that 3,000 people were in
attendance at this party,2 19 the purpose of which was apparently "to cele-
brate Pineda's many good works as the head of the town's social-welfare
agency and to kick off her campaign to succeed her husband," as
mayor.220
Reportedly, Pineda Villa was about to give her speech when she
learned that the students were approaching the plaza where the party was
211. Id.
212. Sullivan, supra note 5.
213. Johnson, supra note 208. During the Tlatelolco Massacre, government forces
clashed with student protestors in Mexico City, leaving hundreds dead or injured.
Kate Doyle, TLATELOLCO MASSACRE: DECLASSIFIED U.S. DOCU-
MENTS ON MEXICO AND THE EVENTS OF 1968, National Security Archive,
Groizei WASHINGTON UNIVIEISITY, http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB1O/intro.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
214. Johnson, supra note 208.
215. Karla Zabludovsky, Suspected Student Massacre Shocks Violence-Weary Mexico,




218. Michael Daly, Mexico's First Lady of Murder Is on the Lam, DAILY BEAST (Oct.
29, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/10/29/mexico-s-first-lady-of-
murder-is-on-the-lam.html.
219. Mayor's Wife Responsible For Massacre?, BORDERLAND BEAT (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/10/mayors-wife-responsible-for-massacre.
html.
220. Daly, supra note 218.
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taking place. 221 According to one report, Pineda Villa told one of her
guards to "STOP THEM ,"222 with another account indicating that she
gave orders to "[t]each them a lesson. '223 Yet another report stated that
it was in fact Abarca who told the police to "teach them a lesson. 224 The
Attorney General's office also purportedly has a recording of Abarca
telling police to stop the students from coming to the plaza "in any way
possible. '225 Irrespective of who gave the orders or what the orders spe-
cifically entailed, Pineda Villa's speech was undisturbed, and "[s]he and
her husband danced to the band in the plaza as the students were being
tortured and shot in a remote place outside of town. '226
B. THE ATTACK ON THE STUDENTS
The events that unfolded following the orders from Abarca and Pineda
Villa are somewhat unclear, but every account paints a very tragic pic-
ture. Upon hearing the orders from the mayor and his wife, Iguala police
responded by firing on the students.227 In defense of their actions, Mexi-
can authorities asserted that the students had hijacked a bus; but students
from the college, who indicated that they were attempting to hitchhike a
ride from a local bus so that they could return to school, disputed this
claim.2 28 Regardless of the motivations of the attackers, police forces,
along with other "unidentified gunmen," began to shoot at the buses as
they were driving away.229 Mexican prosecutors subsequently indicated
that the drug gang "Guerreros Unidos," with whom Pineda Villa has
close family ties, took part in the attack.230 Thus, they were likely the
other gunmen referred to in earlier reports.
221. Id.
222. Mayor's Wife Responsible For Massacre?, supra note 219.
223. Daly, supra note 218.
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229. Jo Tuckman, Scores of students still missing after ambush by Mexican police and
gunmen, Trn GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2015, 5:02 PM), http://www.theguardian.coml
world/2014/sep/30/scores-students-missing-after-ambush-gunmen-mexican-police;
Sullivan, supra note 5.
230. Ludovica Laccino, Mexico missing students: Iguala mayor's wife Maria Pineda Villa
charged with organised crime, INT'L Bus. TIMiES (Jan. 6, 2015, 11:04 AM), http://
www.ibtimes.co.uk/mexico-missing-students-iguala-mayors-wife-maria-pineda-vil
la-charged-organised-crime-1482092; Leticia Pineda, Mexico leader vows justice
over 43 missing students, YAHroo! NEWS (Oct. 6, 2014, 5:38 PM), http://
news.yahoo.com/hitmen-admit-killing-1 7-mexican-students-prosecutor-005040009.
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The buses at which the police were firing then stopped and some of the
students, who were unarmed, stepped out.2 31 These actions by the stu-
dents only increased the attack by the police and gunmen. 232 Three stu-
dents were killed in this initial attack,233 and most atrociously, one of
their bodies "was found dumped nearby later, his face reportedly skinned
and his eyes gouged out. '234 Many students attempted to flee during this
initial attack by the police,2 35 but a number of students were taken into
police custody.2 36 When some students came back to the scene of the
shooting a few hours later to speak to reporters, they were once again
greeted with gunfire.2 37 Though none of the students were killed in this
subsequent attack, three bystanders were hit by bullets.2 38 Between the
two attacks, a total of six people were killed.239 Twenty-five more were
injured.240 Fifty-seven students went missing initially, fourteen of whom
thankfully reappeared. 241 In total, however, forty-three students were
not heard from again.242
C. THE SUBSEQUENT KIDNAPPING
Those who witnessed the attacks indicated that the surviving students
were placed in police vehicles and taken into custody by Iguala police.2 43
According to Mexican authorities, Iguala police then gave the students to
police "in the neighboring town of Cocula, who delivered the [forty-
three] young men to the Guerreros Unidos,' ' 244 the drug gang to which
Pineda Villa has family ties to.2 45 According to Sidronio Casarrubias Sal-
gado (Casarrubias), the leader of Guerreros Unidos, once the students
were turned over to him, one of his gang members indicated to him that
the students were members of a rival gang.246 Upon hearing this, Casar-
231. Tuckman, supra note 229.
232. Id.
233. Sullivan, supra note 5.




238. Sullivan, supra note 5. Although the reports of what happened are conflicting, the
three bystanders have been described as "the driver of a bus carrying a soccer
team, a 15-year-old player and a woman in a taxi." Id. One account stated that
"[s]hots were.., fired at a bus carrying third division football team Los Avispones,
which the gunmen presumably mistook for a bus seized by the students," and that
the driver and soccer player were killed when the bus crashed. Mexican students
missing after protest in Iguala, supra note 2.
239. Missing Mexico students: Iguala mayor 'ordered attack', supra note 3.
240. Laccino, supra note 6.
241. See Tuckman, supra note 229.
242. Laccino, supra note 6.
243. Id.
244. AFP, Mexico catches chief of gang in missing students case, Ti-n- TEL EGRAPI (Oct.
18, 2014, 1:34 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamerica
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rubias "ordered their disappearance. ' 247 Members of Guerreros Unidos
then put the students in a truck, and drove them to Pueblo Viejo.
2 4 8
According to another member of Guerreros Unidos, while in the truck,
the students "were so tightly-packed . . . that 15 died of suffocation in
transit" to the garbage dump where the gang members planned to take
them. 24 9 Upon arriving at the dump, gang members shot and killed the
surviving students. 250 They then placed the students' bodies in a pile with
wood and set them on fire.2 5 1 The fire burned for many hours and, when
it cooled, the gang members put the students' remains in plastic bags and
deposited them in a river.252 A bone fragment found at the dump has
been confirmed as belonging to Alexander Mora Venancio, one of the
missing students.2 53 On January 27, 2015, Mexico's government officially
declared that the forty-three students who went missing were dead, on
the basis of forensic testing and confessions by those involved.
2 54
D. THE ARRESTS OF AND CHARGES AGAINST ABARCA AND PINEDA
VILLA
Initially following the attack on the protesting students, Mayor Abarca
asserted "he had no knowledge of the shooting because he was too busy
'dancing' at his wife's party when it happened. '255 In a radio interview
on the evening of the attack, Abarca purportedly stated: "Believe me, I
am very sorry.... And with all the truth I say I don't know what hap-
pened. '256 Abarca then "requested a 30-day leave of absence, which was
granted. '257 This leave of absence took place right before federal offi-
cials in Mexico found the mass graves where the students had been
killed.2 58 According to one report, following the grant of his leave of
absence, Abarca "walked out the back door of City Hall."' 259 Another
report stated that Abarca had been "last seen being led away by local
247. Id.
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249. Harriet Alexander, Missing Mexico students: 'We shot them then burnt the bodies',
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police. ' '26° Regardless, Abarca and his wife Pineda Villa both went miss-
ing following the events of September 26, 2014, at which point federal
officials began searching for them.2 61 On October 22, 2014, Mexican offi-
cials indicated that arrests warrant for Abarca, Pineda Villa, and the chief
of police of Iguala had been issued.262
On November 4, 2014, Abarca and Pineda Villa were arrested outside
of Mexico City in a house they had been renting.2 63 The couple suppos-
edly chose that particular house as a hideout because it looked like it was
abandoned. 264 Neither resisted their arrest, 265 and they were subse-
quently taken in by federal authorities for interrogation.2 66 On Novem-
ber 14, 2014, Guerrero state prosecutors charged Abarca with "six counts
of aggravated homicide and one count of attempted homicide" for the
attack that took place on September 26, 2014.267 According to one re-
port, however, these charges only came after the Working Group "im-
plored.., the Mexican government to investigate the disappearances and
noted that the steps taken would show the country's willingness to re-
spond to allegations of human rights violations. '268
On January 13, 2015, federal authorities announced that Abarca would
face charges for the Iguala Mass Kidnapping269 despite previously indi-
cating that they lacked the evidence to file charges against either Abarca
or Pineda Villa.270 Abarca's charges, however, were for kidnapping-not
enforced disappearance. 271 Mexico's former Attorney General Jesus Mu-
rillo Karam had previously indicated on December 7, 2014, that Abarca
and Pineda Villa would be charged with forced disappearance. 272 Some
earlier reports of the arrest of Abarca and Pineda Villa also stated that
260. See Wilkinson, supra note 258.
261. Id.
262. Mexico missing case: Iguala Mayor Jose Luis Abarca held, BBC Ni ws (Nov. 4,
2014, 3:42 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-29896513.
263. See id.
264. Wilkinson, supra note 258.
265. See Mexico missing case: Iguala Mayor Jose Luis Abarca held, supra note 262.
Speaking about his arrest, Abarca purportedly stated: "I could no longer stand
hiding." Ayotzinapa: A Timeline of the Mass Disappearance That Has Shaken
Mexico, VICE Ni-ws (Dec. 9, 2014, 2:20 PM), https://news.vice.com/article/
ayotzinapa-a-timeline-of-the-mass-disappearance-that-has-shaken-mexico.
266. See Wilkinson, supra note 258.
267. Valerie Howell, Former Mexico mayor formally charged in disappearance of 43
students, JURIST (Nov. 14, 2014, 2:11 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/11/
former-mexico-mayor-formally-charged-in-the-disappearance-of-43-students.php.
268. Id.
269. Jose Luis Abarca, Former Mexican Mayor, Faces Kidnapping Charge In Case Of
43 Missing Students, Tin WORLD POST (Jan. 14, 2015, 1:59 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/14/jose-luis-abarca-missing-
students n_6467668.html.
270. Mexican Authorities Unable to Charge Iguala Mayor and His Wife, supra note 13.
271. Jose Luis Abarca, Former Mexican Mayor, Faces Kidnapping Charge In Case Of
43 Missing Students, supra note 269.
272. Ayotzinapa: A Timeline of the Mass Disappearance That Has Shaken Mexico,
supra note 265. According to another report, a state prosecutor indicated that
those involved in the Iguala Mass Kidnapping could be charged with "forced dis-
appearance." Tuckman, supra note 229.
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the couple had in fact been charged with forced disappearance. 273 As of
the time of writing this article, however, the Attorney General's Office
has charged neither Abarca nor Pineda Villa with forced disappearance
under Article 215-A of the Federal Criminal Code.274 Moreover, with
the recent kidnapping charge against Abarca, a subsequent charge of en-
forced disappearance against him seems unlikely. In the words of one
source,
[I]t is noteworthy the fact that the Federal Public Ministry has now
chosen to exercise criminal action for the crime of kidnapping, be-
cause it is likely, that if in the future the prosecutors charge him with
enforced disappearance, Abarca can apply for and obtain an amparo,
on grounds of being tried twice for the same events.275
Federal authorities have also yet to charge Pineda Villa with enforced
disappearance. 276
In sum, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that through personal
motives and corruption, Abarca and Pineda Villa committed a horrible
atrocity in the Iguala Mass Kidnapping. This tragedy has been exacer-
bated by the federal government's failure to formally charge either of
them with the crime of enforced disappearance. As discussed below, the
actions of Abarca and Pineda Villa, as well as the federal government's
failure to charge either with the enforced disappearance, violated Articles
One, Six, and Twenty-Three of the Convention.
V. MEXICO'S FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE CONVENTION
This part of the article discusses how the events surrounding the Iguala
Mass Kidnapping, as well as federal officials' failure to prosecute Abarca
and Pineda Villa for enforced disappearance, violated the Convention.
While Mexico's government arguably violated other articles of the Con-
vention through the Iguala Mass Kidnapping,277 the focus here is on Arti-
cles One, Six, and Twenty-Three.
273. See, e.g., Federal Police Capture Fugitive Iguala Mayor, Wife in Mexico City,
PANAM POST (Nov. 4, 2014, 3:15 PM), http://panampost.com/panam-staff/2014/tl/
04/federal-police-capture-fugitive-iguala-mayor-wife-in-mexico-city/.
274. See Alfredo M6ndez, Iguala, Guerrero, Mexico: Former Mayor Formally Charged
With Kidnapping 43 Ayotzinapa Students, MExico VOICES: ADDRESSING MEX-
ICO'S CHALLENGES (Feb. 25, 2015), http://mexicovoices.blogspot.com/2015/02/
iguala-guerrero-mexico-former-mayor.html.
275. Iguala mayor finally charged in the disappearance of normalistas; if justice was
served in another case the students would be alive, BORDERLAND BEAT (Feb. 25,
2015), http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/02/iguala-mayor-finally-charged-
in.html.
276. See M6ndez, supra note 274. Pineda Villa has been charged with "organi[z]eed
crime and use of illicit funds," but it is not clear whether these charges are related
to the Iguala Mass Kidnapping. Laccino, supra note 230.
277. See, e.g., AMNEsTY IhERNATIONAL, Mexico: Submission To The UN Committee
On Enforced Disappearances 7-8 (2015) (discussing how the actions of local police
in the Iguala Mass Kidnapping violated article seventeen of the Convention).
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A. VIOLATION OF ARTICLE ONE
As discussed above in Part II.C.1, Article One of the Convention pro-
vides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance.1 278 An
obvious yet necessary preliminary question, then, is whether the actions
of Abarca and Pineda Villa, local police forces, and the Guerreros Unidos
constituted an "enforced disappearance" within the definition used by the
Convention. 279 The Convention defines "enforced disappearance" as:
[1] the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation
of liberty [2] by agents of the State or by persons or groups of per-
sons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, [3] followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disap-
peared person, [4] which place such a person outside the protection
of the law. 280
For purposes of clarity, the above definition has been broken down into
four subparts, each of which will be addressed below.
1. Deprivation of Liberty
First, there must be an "arrest, detention, abduction or any other form
of deprivation of liberty."'28 ' As discussed above, during the Iguala Mass
Kidnapping, the forty-three college students were placed in police cars
and then handed over to members of the Guerreros Unidos, who took
the students to a garbage dump to kill them. 28 2 Such actions clearly sat-
isfy the definition of a deprivation of liberty because the students were
left completely helpless at the hands of police forces and gang members.
Thus, the first part of the definition of "enforced disappearance" under
the Convention has been met.
2. State Agents or Support
Second, the deprivation of liberty must be "by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State. '28 3 Thus, there are two alternative ways to
278. Convention, supra note 14, art. 1.1.
279. In addressing the inevitable inquiry as to whether the actions of individual state
actors can violate the Convention, scholarly commentary suggests that they can.
One author in particular posited:
Determining state responsibility presupposes the involvement of the
state in the crime for which it can be held responsible. The exploration
of the phenomenon of enforced disappearances . . . illustrate[s] that
states have been involved in different ways in enforced disappearance.
Most obviously, there are instances where state agents themselves are
the perpetrators of this crime. The police, security forces or the intelli-
gence services arrest a person and hold him or her in secret prisons while
categorically denying the act to the outside world.
VERMEULEN, supra note 42, at 97.
280. Convention, supra note 14, art. 2.
281. Id.
282. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the kidnapping of the forty-three college students).
283. Convention, supra note 14, art. 2.
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meet this part of the definition: through action by a state agent, or
through support of a state agent.284 During the Iguala Mass Kidnapping,
Iguala police initially took the students away on orders of Abarca and
Pineda Villa.2 85 Iguala police then handed the students over to Cocula
police, who in turn gave the students to members of Guerreros Unidos. 286
As a result, for purposes of the Convention, the initial deprivation of lib-
erty-that is, when the students were first taken away by the police-
clearly meets the definition under Article Two because the police de-
tained the students on orders by and with support of Abarca and Pineda
Villa.
A more difficult question is whether the members of the Guerreros
Unidos were acting "with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State" 287 when they took the students to the garbage dump and killed
them. Reports indicate that the students were ordered to be disappeared
by Casarrubias, the leader of Guerreros Unidos, after he was told that
they were members of a rival gang.2 88 While this points to Guerreros
Unidos having a motive other than orders from Iguala or Cocula police to
kill the students, such motivation does not preclude a finding of "en-
forced disappearance" under the meaning of Article Two. Rather, Arti-
cle Two encompasses a broad definition, whereby an enforced
disappearance may occur by mere "acquiescence of the State. '289 The
fact that Cocula police handed the students over to the Guerreros
Unidos, a gang known for its violence,2 90 shows that they acquiesced to
whatever the gang intended to do with the students. Their actions were
therefore clearly within the definition of Article Two. Accordingly, the
second part of the definition of "enforced disappearance" under Article
Two of the Convention has been met, both through the students' initial by
the police on orders by Abarca and Pineda Villa and through the police
acquiescence to the actions of the members of Guerreros Unidos.
3. Concealment of the Fate
Third, the deprivation of liberty must be "followed by a refusal to ac-
knowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person. '291 In the case of the Iguala
284. See id.
285. See supra Parts IV.B-C.
286. See supra Part IV.C.
287. Convention, supra note 14, art. 2.
288. Missing Mexico students: Iguala mayor 'ordered attack', supra note 3.
289. Convention, supra note 14, art. 2. (emphasis added).
290. See, e.g., Chivis Martinez, 10 Decapitated Heads Found at Slaughterhouse, BOR-
DERLANi) BEAT (Mar. 18, 2012), http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/03/10-de-
capitated-heads-found-at.html (describing the gruesome killing of ten people
outside of Acapulco, Mexico, where the victims' heads were decapitated and
placed in a row next to a message written by Guerreros Unidos that stated: "This is
what will happen to all those who continue supporting the [La Familia Michoacdn]
fucking shit kidnappers, don't continue living of the people, your father is here
already, kidnappers and fucking extortionists.").
291. Convention, supra note 14, art. 2.
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Mass Kidnapping, two different actions can arguably satisfy this
requirement.
First, as discussed above, Mayor Abarca expressly denied any knowl-
edge of the attack and subsequent kidnapping of the forty-three college
students.292 His statements, coupled with his actions in fleeing Iguala
with Pineda Villa for over a month, constituted a concealment of the fate
of the forty-three college students. While it is unclear whether Abarca
and Pineda Villa knew exactly where the students had been taken by the
police and subsequently by the Guerreros Unidos, there is no question
that that, given Pineda Villa's ties to the gang, the two possessed knowl-
edge that could have ultimately led to the students' whereabouts. Their
actions thus satisfy this portion of the definition in Article Two.
Second, as discussed above in Part IV.C, after killing the students,
members of the Guerreros Unidos burned their bodies, placed the re-
mains in garbage bags, and dumped them in a river.293 Most obviously,
the heinous actions by the Guerreros Unidos in attempting to hide the
remains of the forty-three college students were a "concealment of the
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person," 294-the entire purpose
was to prevent the discovery of the location of the students' remains.
Moreover, as they were acting with the acquiescence of the state at this
time,2 95 their actions meet the third part of the definition of "enforced
disappearance" in article two of the Convention.
4. Placement outside Protections of Law
Finally, the Convention states that the actions by the state actors must
"place such a person outside the protection of the law."' 296 In the Iguala
Mass Kidnapping, the forty-three college students were placed outside of
the protection of the law at two separate times. First, they were placed
outside of legal protection when they were abducted and detained by
members of their own government.2 97 During this detention, any attempt
to ask for help or protection most certainly would have been futile as the
perpetrators were those who were supposed to be enforcing the law: the
police. Second, the students were placed outside of the law's protection
when the police gave them to members of Guerreros Unidos.2 98 Through
these actions, the police demonstrated not only that they themselves were
not going to be of assistance to the students, but also that the police were
going to make themselves scarce, thus removing what little to non-exis-
tent protection they would have theoretically provided to the students
when the gang members took them to the garbage dump. In both cases,
292. See supra Part IV.D.
293. See supra Part IV.C.
294. Convention, supra note 14, art. 2.
295. See supra Part V.A.2.
296. Convention, supra note 14, art. 2.
297. See supra Part IV.C.
298. Id.
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the police placed the students outside of the protections of the law and
satisfied the final part of the definition of "enforced disappearance."
Simply put, the actions by Abarca, Pineda Villa, local police forces, and
the Guerreros Unidos, constituted an "enforced disappearance" within
the meaning of Article Two of the Convention. As Article One creates a
complete prohibition of enforced disappearances, these state actors-and
non-state actors operating under the acquiescence of state actors-vio-
lated Article One of the Convention through their actions in the Iguala
Mass Kidnapping.
B. VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE SIX
As discussed above in Part II.C.2, Article Six of the convention
mandates:
1. Each State Party shall take the necessary measures to hold crimi-
nally responsible at least:
(a) Any person who commits, orders, solicits or induces the commis-
sion of, attempts to commit, is an accomplice to or participates in an
enforced disappearance;
(b) A superior who:
(i) Knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly in-
dicated, that subordinates under his or her effective authority and
control were committing or about to commit a crime of enforced
disappearance;
(ii) Exercised effective responsibility for and control over activities
which were concerned with the crime of enforced disappearance;
and
(iii) Failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
his or her power to prevent or repress the commission of an en-
forced disappearance or to submit the matter to the competent au-
thorities for investigation and prosecution .... 299
Although many state actors should be held criminally responsible for
the Iguala Mass Kidnapping, this discussion focuses on the culpability of
Abarca and Pineda Villa.
1. The Meaning of "Criminally Responsible"
A critical threshold question in addressing whether the Mexican gov-
ernment violated Article Aix is the meaning of the words "criminally re-
sponsible" in that portion of the Convention. Article Six indicates that
"[e]ach State Party shall take the necessary measures to hold criminally
responsible" those who are involved in enforced disappearances. 3°° This
Article is silent, however, as to whether holding those involved criminally
responsible means prosecuting them for the crime of enforced disappear-
299. Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.(a)-(b). Article six contains two additional
provisions but neither are central to the discussion here. See supra Part II.C.2
300. Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.(a)-(b).
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ance.301 As discussed above, Abarca has been charged with the crime of
kidnapping for his actions in the Iguala tragedy.302 Thus, if one were to
look solely to the text of Article Six, which mandates only that States
Parties hold those who perpetrate enforced disappearances "criminally
responsible," 30 3 one could argue that Mexico's government is complying
with this Article by bringing any criminal charge against Abarca for the
Iguala Mass Kidnapping.
But the broader context of Article Six shows that the drafters of the
Convention intended "criminally responsible" to mean prosecution for
the crime of enforced disappearance. For instance, Article Seven states
that "[e]ach State Party shall make the offen[s]e of enforced disappear-
ance punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account its ex-
treme seriousness.130 4 This language indicates that the drafters of the
Convention had a vested interest in States Parties prosecuting those who
commit enforced disappearances with the crime of enforced disappear-
ance. Moreover, after the Working Group's visit to Mexico, it appeared
to show disdain for the practice of enforced disappearances being
charged as lesser offenses. 305
Thus, between Article Seven's language and the Working Group's
comments about the prosecution of enforced disappearances, it is reason-
able to conclude that the words "criminally responsible" in Article Six
mean charging the perpetrator of the enforced disappearance with the
crime of enforced disappearance and not another crime. This interpreta-
tion of Article Six will be examined in the discussion below.
2. Subsection ](a) of Article Six
Subsection 1(a) of Article Six explicitly states that States Parties to the
Convention must hold criminally responsible "[any person who commits,
orders, solicits or induces the commission of, attempts to commit, is an
accomplice to or participates in an enforced disappearance. ' '306 Hence,
there is broad culpability for those who have any sort of involvement in
an enforced disappearance. 30 7
As discussed above, accounts of the Iguala Mass Kidnapping give dif-
fering reports as to whether Abarca or Pineda Villa ordered the Iguala
police to stop the student protests.30 8 Additionally, none of the reports
301. See id. art. 6.1.
302. Jose Luis Abarca, Former Mexican Mayor, Faces Kidnapping Charge In Case Of
43 Missing Students, supra note 269.
303. Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.(a)-(b).
304. Id. art. 7.1. (emphasis added).
305. See Working Group Report, supra note 73, $ 34 ("Often, the prosecution services
submit cases as minor offen[s]es instead of the offen[s]e of enforced disappearance
(in those federal entities where the act has been classified as an offen[s]e) and
judges do not use their powers to reclassify the offen[s]es.").
306. Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.(a).
307. See id.
308. See supra Part IV.A. For the purposes of this article, it is presumed that both
Abarca and Pineda Villa gave some sort of order to stop the students from pro-
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indicate that either expressly ordered that the students disappear. To the
contrary, most reports indicate that Abarca and Pineda Villa ordered the
police to stop the students or to teach them a lesson, not necessarily to
cause their disappearance. 30 9
It instead appears that the leader of Guerreros Unidos ordered the stu-
dents to disappear.310 Under the language of subsection 1.(a) that re-
quires States Parties to hold criminally responsible those who "order" or
"solicit" an enforced disappearance, then, Abarca and Pineda Villa's ac-
tions were insufficient to trigger State Party responsibility for enforced
disappearance prosecution.
But Article Six is broader than that. Indeed, it contains expansive lan-
guage that brings Abarca and Pineda Villa's conduct within the meaning
of the Article and triggers Mexico's prosecutorial responsibility. Subsec-
tion 1.(a) specifically states that States Parties have an obligation to pros-
ecute those who "induce[] the commission of . . . an enforced
disappearance."' 311 As discussed above, Abarca and Pineda Villa ordered
the police to either stop the students or teach them a lesson.312 While
these actions alone may not be sufficient to trigger State Party responsi-
bility under Article Six, the broader context of Abarca and Pineda Villa's
relationship to the community in Iguala demonstrates that these actions
induced the students' enforced disappearance by police and the Guer-
reros Unidos gang. In fact, after the Iguala Mass Kidnapping, the leader
of Guerreros Unidos stated that Abarca "had bribed local police to let
the gang act with impunity and had even allowed gang members to infil-
trate the force."'313 Moreover, as discussed above, Pineda Villa has family
members in the Guerreros Unidos gang. 314 These relationships suggest
that the couple had little investment in holding either local police or the
Guerreros Unidos responsible for their criminal activities in Iguala. Or-
ders to the police to stop the students or teach them a lesson therefore
clearly gave the police and the Guerreros Unidos free reign to do as they
pleased with the students. For that reason-and even though they may
not have expressly ordered or solicited an enforced disappearance-
Abarca and Pineda Villa's directives to the police on the day of the Iguala
testing, thus triggering a responsibility on the part of the Mexican government to
prosecute them for the crime of enforced disappearance.
309. See supra Part IV.A.
310. Missing Mexico students: Iguala mayor 'ordered attack', supra note 3.
311. Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.(a).
312. See supra Part IV.A.
313. Missing Mexico students: Iguala mayor 'ordered attack', supra note 3. Regrettably,
corruption between police forces and drug trafficking organizations remains wide-
spread across Mexico. See Rosa Acevedo, Stepping Up the mirida Initiative: Com-
munity Policing As A Foundation for Building Resilient Communities and
Reforming the Rule of Law in Mexico, 44 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 225,235 (2014) ("The
combination of the lucrative bribes the [drug trafficking organizations] provide to
all levels of ranking police officials and the high impunity rates creates a breeding
ground for corruption to thrive in a system the Mexican public does not trust.").
314. Laccino, supra note 230.
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Mass Kidnapping induced the police to commit actions that ultimately led
to the student's disappearance.
Accordingly, Abarca and Pineda Villa' actions triggered a duty on the
part of the Mexican government to prosecute them for the crime of en-
forced disappearance under Article Six of the Convention. The federal
government's failure to do so constitutes a violation of this important
provision.
3. Subsection 1. (b) of Article Six
Alternatively, Mexico's government has a duty to charge Abarca and
Pineda Villa with the crime of enforced disappearance based on the lan-
guage in subsection 1.(b) of Article Six. Under that subsection, a State
Party must prosecute
[a] superior who:
(i) Knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly in-
dicated, that subordinates under his or her effective authority and
control were committing or about to commit a crime of enforced
disappearance;
(ii) Exercised effective responsibility for and control over activities
which were concerned with the crime of enforced disappearance;
and
(iii) Failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
his or her power to prevent or repress the commission of an en-
forced disappearance or to submit the matter to the competent au-
thorities for investigation and prosecution[.] 315
As this subsection contains three subparts, each subpart will be addressed
separately below.
a. Knowledge or Conscious Disregard of Information
Under subpart 1.(b)(i), State Parties must hold criminally responsible
superiors who "[k]new, or consciously disregarded information which
clearly indicated, that subordinates under his or her effective authority
and control were committing or about to commit a crime of enforced
disappearance. '316 Here, although some reports have described Abarca
as being the mastermind behind the Iguala Mass Kidnapping,317 it is un-
clear whether either Abarca or Pineda Villa knew or consciously disre-
garded information that "clearly indicated" that the police forces under
their authority were going to commit an enforced disappearance, as re-
quired by this subpart of Article Six. 318 It is certainly reasonable to infer
that the relationship both had with local police and drug gangs, coupled
with their orders to local police, put them on notice that the students
would be handled in a violent manner. But there is no indication that
315. Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.(a)-(b).
316. Id. art. 6.1.(a)(i).
317. Laccino, supra note 6.
318. See Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.(a)(i).
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they either knew or disregarded information that indicated an enforced
disappearance took place or would take place. As a result, this subpart
cannot be used to trigger Mexico's responsibility to prosecute Abarca or
Pineda Villa for the crime of enforced disappearance.
b. Exercise of Effective Responsibility and Control
Subpart 1.(b)(ii) indicates that States Parties have a duty to prosecute
superiors who "[e]xercised effective responsibility for and control over
activities which were concerned with the crime of enforced disappear-
ance."'3 19 Of critical importance in this subpart is the fact that it encom-
passes "activities which were concerned with the crime of enforced
disappearance. ' 320 Under this broad language, Abarca and Pineda Villa
clearly had control over activities that concerned the enforced disappear-
ance committed by the police and the Guerreros Unidos. Specifically, as
discussed above, Abarca and Pineda Villa ordered the police to either
stop the students or teach them a lesson.32 1 When they heard these or-
ders, the police attacked the students. 322 Although it is unclear whether
the police would have ultimately acted without the orders by Abarca and
Pineda Villa, the orders put into motion the events that ultimately led to
the students' disappearance. As this subpart of the Convention merely
requires that superiors have "responsibility for and control over activities
which were concerned" with the disappearance, 323 by ordering that the
students be stopped or taught a lesson, Abarca and Pineda Villa's actions
fall under this subpart. Accordingly, this subpart can be used to trigger
the responsibility of the Mexican government to prosecute the couple for
enforced disappearance.
c. Failure to Take All Necessary and Reasonable Preventative
Measures
Finally, subpart 1.(b)(iii) mandates that States Parties hold criminally
responsible those superiors who "[f]ailed to take all necessary and rea-
sonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress the com-
mission of an enforced disappearance or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. ' 32
4
As discussed above, it is unclear whether Abarca or Pineda Villa knew
that their orders would lead to an enforced disappearance. But it is rea-
sonable to conclude that, based on the nature of their orders, Abarca's
alleged bribery of local police, and Pineda Villa's familial relationship to
members of the Guerreros Unidos, the two knew that their orders would
cause some form of violence. Had they truly wanted to stop the students
319. Id. art. 6.1.(b)(ii).
320. Id.
321. See supra Part V.b.2.
322. Missing Mexico students: Iguala mayor 'ordered attack', supra note 3.
323. Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.(b)(ii).
324. Id. art. 6.1.(b)(iii).
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from protesting without the police using violence, they could clarify their
instructions to the Iguala police. But they did not. Thus, they failed to
take reasonable measures to prevent the enforced disappearance under
the first provision of subpart 1.(b)(iii). 325
Further, as discussed above, following the events of the Iguala Mass
Kidnapping, Abarca denied any knowledge of the attack on the students,
and he and his wife later fled to Mexico City.326 These actions fall under
the second provision of subpart 1.(b)(iii), which triggers State Party
prosecutorial responsibility for superiors who fail "to submit the matter
to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. ' 327 Thus,
under both provisions of subpart l.(b)(iii) of Article Six, Abarca and
Pineda Villa's actions triggered a duty on the part of the Mexican govern-
ment to prosecute them for the crime of enforced disappearance.
In sum, Abarca and Pineda Villa's actions created a duty on the part of
Mexico's government to prosecute them for the crime of enforced disap-
pearance based on the language in subsection 1.(a) and subparts
1.(b)(ii)-(iii) of subsectionl.(b) in Article Six of the Convention. As ad-
dressed above, however, Mexico's federal government has yet to charge
either with the crime of enforced disappearance, and such a charge is
unlikely to come against Abarca. 328 This failure to prosecute on the part
of Mexico's government violates its Article Six obligations under the
Convention.
C. VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE TWENTY-THREE
As discussed above in Part II.C.3, under Article Twenty-Three of the
Convention:
1. Each State Party shall ensure that the training of law enforcement
personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and
other persons who may be involved in the custody or treatment of any
person deprived of liberty includes the necessary education and infor-
mation regarding the relevant provisions of this Convention, in order
to:
(a) Prevent the involvement of such officials in enforced
disappearances;
(b) Emphasize the importance of prevention and investigations in
relation to enforced disappearances;
(c) Ensure that the urgent need to resolve cases of enforced disap-
pearance is recognized.
2. Each State Party shall ensure that orders or instructions prescrib-
ing, authorizing or encouraging enforced disappearance are prohibited.
Each State Party shall guarantee that a person who refuses to obey
such an order will not be punished.
325. See id.
326. See supra Part I.V.D.
327. Convention, supra note 14, art. 6.1.(b)(iii).
328. See supra Part IV.D.
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3. Each State Party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that
the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article who have reason
to believe that an enforced disappearance has occurred or is planned
report the matter to their superiors and, where necessary, to the appro-
priate authorities or bodies vested with powers of review or remedy.32 9
Although this Article contains a number of different provisions, of impor-
tance here are subsection 1.(a) and subsection 3.330
1. Subsection 1.(a) of Article Twenty- Three
Subsection 1.(a) of Article Twenty-Three provides that States Parties
must provide training for public officials to "[p]revent the involvement of
such officials in enforced disappearances. '33 1 As discussed above in Part
III.B.4, Mexico's State Party Report addresses a number of different
trainings used by the government to adhere to its obligations under Arti-
cle Twenty-Three, but does not go into great detail about these train-
ings.332 Regardless of how comprehensive these trainings are, they were
manifestly insufficient to prevent the Iguala Mass Kidnapping. As dis-
cussed above, the Iguala Mass Kidnapping was an enforced disappear-
ance that Abarca, Pineda Villa, local police forces, and other officials
were involved in.333 This involvement falls under the language in subsec-
329. Convention, supra note 14, art. 23.1-3.
330. Although subsections 1.(b) and 1.(c) of article twenty-three contain important pro-
visions about what trainings should cover, they are tailored to make sure that offi-
cials recognize the importance of preventing, investigating, and resolving enforced
disappearances. See id. art. 23.1.(b)-(c). While making public officials realize the
significance of enforced disappearances through proper training is an important
goal, the focus of this paper is the actions of public officials, not whether they
recognize the importance of the issue. Certainly, any Mexican public official
would likely state that he or she recognizes the importance of the issue of enforced
disappearances if asked. Even Abarca himself stated on the day of the Iguala
Mass Kidnapping that he was "very sorry" to hear about the tragedy. See Wilkin-
son, supra note 256. (internal quotation marks omitted). For that reason, subsec-
tions 1.(b) and 1(c) of article twenty-three are not included in the discussion in
this section of the article. Subsection 2. of article twenty-three will also be omitted
from this discussion. Under that subsection, "[e]ach State Party shall ensure that
orders or instructions prescribing, authorizing or encouraging enforced disappear-
ance are prohibited. Each State Party shall guarantee that a person who refuses to
obey such an order will not be punished." Convention, supra note 14, art. 23.2.
Regrettably, the section of Mexico's Federal Criminal Code that addresses en-
forced disappearances does not discuss the ordering of enforced disappearances by
public officials. See CPF [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, arts. 215-A-D,
DO, 14 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.). The State Party Report similarly did not address
what trainings are being done to prevent officials from ordering disappearances.
See State Party Report, supra note 61, 226-44. But as it is unclear whether
Abarca, Pineda Villa, or local police forces expressly ordered that the forty-three
students be disappeared, the actions by these officials may not have violated sub-
section 2. of article twenty-three. Accordingly, subsection 2. of article twenty-
three will not be included in this discussion.
331. Convention, supra note 14, art. 23.1.(a).
332. See supra Part III.B.4.
333. See supra Part V.A (concluding that the actions of Abarca, Pineda Villa, local
police forces, and the Guerreros Unidos constituted an "enforced disappearance"
within the definition used by the Convention).
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tion 1.(a) of Article Twenty-Three of the Convention, and any training
that these officials may have had prior to this tragedy completely failed to
prevent it from happening.334 The lack of proper training is a violation of
subsection 1.(a) of Article Twenty-Three.
2. Subsection 3. of Article Twenty-Three
Under subsection 3. of Article Twenty-Three:
Each State Party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that
[government officials] who have reason to believe that an enforced
disappearance has occurred or is planned report the matter to their
superiors and, where necessary, to the appropriate authorities or
bodies vested with powers of review or remedy. 335
With regard to the Iguala Mass Kidnapping, there is no question that,
at both the state and federal level, the government failed to take ade-
quate measures to ensure that those who believe an enforced disappear-
ance has taken place or will take place report that information to the
proper authorities as prescribed by subsection 3 of Article Twenty-Three
of the Convention. 336 Despite a multitude of government officials' in-
volvement in the attack on and disappearance of the forty-three college
students, weeks passed after the initial attack before so much as a hint of
the students' whereabouts became known.337 Cocula police certainly had
reason to believe that the students would disappear when they handed
them over to the Guerreros Unidos. Undoubtedly, Iguala police were
also put on notice of what would happen to the students once they
handed the students over to Cocula police. Nor is there any doubt that
Abarca and Pineda Villa had knowledge that an enforced disappearance
could take place after their orders to the Iguala police to stop the pro-
testing students. Yet no report indicates that any of these government
officials voluntarily came forward to report this information to proper
authorities immediately following the attack as required by subsection 3
of Article Twenty-Three of the convention.338 This failure to report the
Iguala Mass Kidnapping reflects a violation of Article Twenty-Three not
only by those officials involved, but also by the parent government enti-
ties in their failure to adequately train government officials in the impor-
tance of reporting enforced disappearances.
In grand sum, the events of the Iguala Mass Kidnapping unequivocally
constituted violations of Articles One, Six, and Twenty-Three of the Con-
vention. These violations are particularly unfortunate given how soon
they came after Mexico's State Party Report, which glowed with opti-
mism regarding Mexico's stated adherence to the Convention.
334. See Convention, supra note 14, art. 23.1.(a).
335. Id. art. 23.3.
336. See id.
337. See Archibold, supra note 9.
338. See Convention, supra note 14, art. 23.3.
"YA ME CANSE"
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF MEXICO
In the wake of the Iguala Mass Kidnapping, there are three concrete
steps that Mexico's government can take now to appropriately handle the
situation and ensure that similar kidnappings do not occur again. These
recommendations are far from comprehensive or exhaustive, 339 but they
are a good starting place for Mexico's federal and state governments in
taking constructive steps to address this tragedy and show the interna-
tional community that Mexico is prepared to take the crime of enforced
disappearance seriously.
A. PROSECUTE ABARCA AND PINEDA VILLA FOR THE CRIME OF
ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE UNDER ARTICLE 215-A OF THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE
Although Article 215-A of the federal criminal code is far from per-
fect,340 prosecuting both Abarca and Pineda Villa under this portion of
the criminal code would send a strong message to the international com-
munity that Mexico's federal government does not tolerate government
officials engaging in enforced disappearances. As discussed above in Part
III.A.1, under this Article of Mexico's federal criminal code, "[a] public
servant who-regardless of whether (s)he has participated in the legal or
illegal detention of an individual or various individuals-helps to secure
their secret detention or deliberately conceals information about it, com-
mits the offen[s]e of an enforced disappearance. '341 Although Abarca
and Pineda Villa clearly committed an enforced disappearance under the
definition of the crime used in the Convention,342 a separate inquiry is
necessary to determine whether their actions constituted an enforced dis-
appearance under the definition in Article 215-A.
339. See MExico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 11-13; Working Group Report,
supra note 73, TT 79-113, for two comprehensive lists of recommendations for
Mexico's federal and state governments to address the ongoing problem of en-
forced disappearances. Given that the focus of this paper is on Mexico's violations
of articles one, six, and twenty-three, the recommendations discussed in this sec-
tion generally address remedying the violations of those articles.
340. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the inadequacies of Mexico's legislative frame-
work with regard to the crime of enforced disappearance, as pointed out by the
Working Group Report and Human Rights Watch's 2013 report). The federal
criminal code unfortunately does not address the possibility of non-state actors
conducting an enforced disappearance with the support of government officials.
Id. For that reason, prosecution of the members of the Guerreros Unidos, who
allegedly were involved in the Iguala Mass Kidnapping, will not be addressed in
this article.
341. MExico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 131 (citing CPF [Federal Criminal
Code], as amended, art. 215-A, DO, 25 de Enero de 2013 (Mex.)). The author is
once again indebted to Human Rights Watch for their English translation of this
portion of the Federal Criminal Code. This translation will be used in the analysis
in this section.
342. See supra Part V.A.
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1. Public Servant
The first part of Article 215-A requires that the person who is prose-
cuted be a public servant.343 There is no question that Abarca, as mayor
of Iguala, was a public servant at the time of the Iguala Mass Kidnapping.
Additionally, at the time of the kidnapping, Pineda Villa was reportedly
the head of a local government agency office, making her a public servant
as well.34 4 Both were therefore public servants within the meaning of
Article 215-A at the time of the Iguala Mass Kidnapping, thus satisfying
the statute's first requirement.
2. Participation in the Detention
Under the second part of Article 215-A, public servants need not par-
ticipate "in the legal or illegal detention of an individual or various indi-
viduals. ' 34 5 This portion of the Article, then, quite properly allocates
broad liability outside of just those individuals who actually facilitated the
disappearance itself. In the case of the Iguala Mass Kidnapping, there is
no indication that Abarca or Pineda Villa directly effectuated the stu-
dents' disappearance. Under the broad language of Article 215-A, how-
ever, such direct participation is not necessary, and would not be fatal to
their prosecution under this section of the Federal Criminal Code.
3. Helping to Secure Detention or Deliberately Concealing Information
About It
The third and final portion of Article 215-A requires that the public
servants "help[ ] to secure [the] secret detention or deliberately conceal[ ]
information about it. ' ' 34 6 Here, both Abarca and Pineda Villa helped to
secure the detention of the students and also concealed information
about the detention.
With regard to helping to secure the detention, reports of the Iguala
Mass Kidnapping indicate that both Abarca and Pineda Villa gave orders
that the protesting students be stopped.347 Those orders set into motion a
chain of events that ultimately led to the disappearance of forty-three
students.348 Although it is unclear whether Abarca and Pineda Villa
knew what the students' ultimate fate would be, or even intended their
disappearance, such knowledge or intent is unnecessary under Article
215-A, which merely requires that the public servants help secure the se-
cret detention.349 Thus, under a liberal construction of this portion of
343. See MEXICO'S DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 131 (citing CPF [Federal Criminal
Code], as amended, art. 215-A, DO, 25 de Enero de 2013 (Mex.)).
344. Daly, supra note 218.
345. See MExico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 131 (citing CPF [Federal Criminal
Code], as amended, art. 215-A, DO, 25 de Enero de 2013 (Mex.)).
346. Id.
347. See supra Part IV.A.
348. See supra Parts IV.B-C.
349. See MExico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 131 (citing CPF [Federal Criminal
Code], as amended, art. 215-A, DO, 25 de Enero de 2013 (Mex.)).
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Article 215-A, Abarca and Pineda Villa both helped to secure the deten-
tion of the forty-three students in the Iguala Mass Kidnapping. 350
Abarca and Pineda Villa's actions also satisfy the third portion of Arti-
cle 215-A's alternative requirement that the public servants "deliberately
conceal[ ] information about" the disappearance. 351 Of relevance here,
although Abarca arguably had at least some information that could lead
to the discovery of the students, he denied any such knowledge immedi-
ately after the event. 352 Moreover, Abarca and Pineda Villa fled Iguala
after the kidnapping and prevented authorities from obtaining any infor-
mation they might have had that could have led to the discovery of the
students. Simply put, Abarca and Pineda Villa's actions meet either of
the two alternative requirements in the third portion of Article 215-A of
the Federal Criminal Code.
In sum, through a liberal yet necessary reading of Article 215-A, Mexi-
can federal authorities have a basis upon which to prosecute both Abarca
and Pineda Villa for the crime of enforced disappearance. To show the
international community that they are prepared to take the widespread
occurrence of enforced disappearances seriously, Mexican federal author-
ities should charge Abarca and Pineda Villa with the crime enforced dis-
appearance under this section of the Federal Criminal Code. Given the
rarity of such prosecutions in Mexico, however, charges against the two
remain unlikely.353 Moreover, the recent kidnapping charge brought
against Abarca by federal authorities lessens any chance of a subsequent
prosecution against him for the crime of enforced disappearance. 354
B. BRING FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE DEFINITIONS OF
"ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE" INTO ALIGNMENT WITH THE
CONVENTION
3 5 5
As discussed above, Mexico should prosecute both Abarca and Pineda
Villa with the crime of enforced disappearance under the Federal Crimi-
350. It is also no coincidence that Pineda Villa has close family connections to the
Guerreros Unidos, the gang that ultimately killed the students and hid their re-
mains. Given her ties to this drug gang, she also likely helped secure the detention
of the students through any communications that she may have had with the Guer-
reros Unidos.
351. See MExico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 131 (citing CPF [Federal Criminal
Code], as amended, art. 215-A, DO, 25 de Enero de 2013 (Mex.)).
352. See supra Part IV.D.
353. See supra Part III.A.2.b.iii (discussing why prosecutions for the crime of enforced
disappearance are rare in Mexico).
354. See supra Part IV.D (addressing why Abarca is unlikely to be charged with the
crime of enforced disappearance in the wake of the federal kidnapping charge
against him).
355. The idea for this recommendation comes from Human Rights Watch's February
2013 report on disappearances in Mexico. See MExico's DISAPPEARED, supra
note 85, at 12 (recommending that state and federal legislators "[a]mend or insert
the definition of enforced disappearance in federal and state criminal codes to
ensure that it is consistent across jurisdictions and includes all conduct included in
the definitions established by the International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance" and other international conventions).
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nal Code. Such charges, however, would require a liberal interpretation
of Article 215-A of the Federal Criminal Code that might give federal
authorities reason for pause. 356 To counter that concern, the definition of
"enforced disappearance" under the Federal Criminal Code should be
changed to align with the definition in the Convention.357 As addressed
above, Abarca and Pineda Villa committed an "enforced disappearance"
under the Convention's definition. 358 Accordingly, bringing a case
against the two under that definition would be much easier than under
the definition used in Article 215-A of the Federal Criminal Code.359
All thirty-two federal entities in Mexico should also adopt the Conven-
tion's definition of "enforced disappearance" in their respective criminal
codes.360 At the time of Mexico's State Party Report, only nineteen fed-
eral entities had made enforced disappearance a crime.361 But the defini-
tions used by these nineteen federal entities vary, making compliance
with the Convention difficult. 362 If all thirty-two federal entities were to
include the crime of enforced disappearance in their criminal codes using
the Convention's definition, it would create uniformity across Mexico and
put public officials at all levels of government on notice that both na-
tional and local governments take this crime seriously.363
Recommending that all levels of Mexico's government adopt the defi-
nition of "enforced disappearance" from the Convention may sound like
a tall order. But with how rare prosecutions for enforced disappearances
in Mexico are, it is not as though such a legislative change would necessi-
tate a restructuring of other legal or administrative frameworks in the
country. 364 To the contrary, if the remaining thirteen federal entities
adopt the Convention's definition and those jurisdictions that have al-
ready criminalized enforced disappearance change a few words, Mexico
could easily bring its codified laws into alignment with the Convention's
mandates. Moreover, Mexico's size provides no excuse for foregoing ac-
tion. As a reference point, the Philippines, a country with a population
very close to that of Mexico, 365 passed historic legislation in 2012 that
criminalized enforced disappearance by using the definition in the
356. See supra Part VI.A.
357. See Miuxico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 12.
358. See supra Part V.A.
359. Compare supra Part V.A. (concluding that Abarca and Pineda Villa committed an
enforced disappearance within the definition used in the Convention), with supra
Part VI.A (discussing how prosecuting Abarca and Pineda Villa under section 215-
A of the Federal Criminal Code would require liberal statutory interpretation).
360. See MExico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 12.
361. See supra Part IlI.A.I.
362. Id.
363. See MEXico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 85, at 12.
364. See supra Part lII.A.2.b.iii.
365. Compare Philippines Population (LIVE), WORLDOMETERS, http://www.worldome
ters.info/world-population/philippines-population/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (es-
timating the population of the Philippines to be 101,342,697 as of March 21, 2015),
with Mexico Population (LIVE), WORLDOMETERS, http://www.worldometers.info/
world-population/mexico-population/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (estimating the
population of Mexico to be 124,867,808 as of March 21, 2015).
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Convention. 366
Mexico now has the opportunity to demonstrate to the international
community that it is prepared to take enforced disappearances seriously.
Uniformly defining the crime of enforced disappearance in alignment
with the definition in the Convention is a critical step toward this goal.
C. IMPLEMENT NATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE TRAININGS ON
PREVENTING ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES
A third and final recommendation for Mexico in the wake of the Iguala
Mass Kidnapping is to create comprehensive national trainings for all
public officials to prevent enforced disappearances. As discussed above
in Part II.C.3, Article Twenty-Three of the Convention imposes training
requirements on States Parties with regard to preventing enforced disap-
pearances. 367 This Article has been described as "establish[ing] an obli-
gation to educate state officials on the content of [the] convention. '368
Although Mexico's State Party Report discusses the trainings provided to
government officials to meet the obligations of Article Twenty-Three, it
does not address them in detail.369 Regardless of how comprehensive the
trainings may have been, they were ultimately insufficient to prevent the
Iguala Mass Kidnapping.
Mexico needs to create a national training program to educate govern-
ment officials of all levels on preventing and investigating enforced disap-
pearances to meet its Article Twenty-Three obligations. As one author
pointed out, however, "[t]he text of the [Convention] neither further
specifies the nature of such training, nor the frequency with which it must
be provided. '370 This author opined that "[t]he purpose of such program-
mes must strive to prevent [State Officials'] involvement in enforced dis-
appearances. Also, the programmes must aim to raise awareness about
the importance of prevention and investigation. '371 Specifically:
As to the content of such training, the case law provides a foundation
for including not only the provisions of the [Convention] but also
updates on the output of the [Committee on Enforced Disappear-
ances]. Additionally... it is important that not only the norms in the
[Convention] are addressed in the training but also, for instance, the
way in which authorities must deal with complaints of enforced dis-
appearances and the dangers accompanying such complaints. 372
366. See Philippines passes landmark law criminalizing enforced disappearances,
OHCHR (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Philippines-
passescriminalizingenforceddisappearances.aspx ("Although the Philippines has
not yet ratified the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearances, the new law adopts the Convention's definition of
enforced or involuntary disappearances in its entirety.").
367. See Convention, supra note 14, art. 23.1.(a).
368. VERMEULLEN, supra note 42, at 467 (citing Convention, supra note 14, art. 23).
369. See State Party Report, supra note 61, TT 226-44.
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In addition to this commentator's recommendations, such trainings
should also specifically address the statutory penalties for participating in
an enforced disappearance. Doing so would create increased disincen-
tives for Mexican officials to engage in such heinous crimes.
In brief, Mexico can take important first steps in addressing the Iguala
Mass Kidnappings and preventing similar events in the future by: (1)
prosecuting Abarca and Pineda Villa under article 215-A of the Federal
Criminal Code; (2) creating uniformity in all Mexican criminal codes with
regard the crime of enforced disappearance; and (3) implementing na-
tional trainings on preventing and investigating enforced disappearances.
These steps are critical for the country to show its commitment to meet-
ing its obligations under the Convention.
VII. CONCLUSION
Mexico's State Party Report portrays a favorable image of Mexico's
compliance with the Convention and appreciation of the gravity of en-
forced disappearances. As pleasant as it may be to read the State Party
Report, though, words on paper mean nothing if Mexico does not comply
in practice. Any hint that Mexico was complying with the Convention
prior to September 2014 was completely shattered by the Iguala Mass
Kidnapping. This event is the most recent and horrific demonstration of
Mexico's continued failure to adhere to its international human rights
obligations.
Although the forty-three students who disappeared during the Iguala
Mass Kidnapping will never return,373 there are concrete steps that Mex-
ico's government can take right now to indicate its willingness to meet to
its obligations under the Convention. Specifically, by prosecuting Abarca
and Pineda Villa under the Federal Criminal Code, changing state and
federal legislative definitions of "enforced disappearance" to align with
the definition in the Convention, and implementing a national training
program for all government officials, Mexico can demonstrate its readi-
ness to address the mandates of the Convention.
Now is the time for Mexico's government to show that it is prepared to
act in accordance with international human rights standards. But if the
disappearance and subsequent death of forty-three students on the orders
of the mayor of a Mexican city is not sufficient to rattle Mexico's govern-
ment awake, it is hard to imagine what will be.
373. See Peralta, supra note 11.
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